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Abstract 
The world has experienced rapid changes in the last twenty years concomitant 
of the Revolutions of 1989 (and the subsequent onrush of neoliberal economic 
policies) and the proliferation of Information and Communication Technology (ICT), 
but has higher ed, and particularly, the study of English literature modified in 
accordance to the cultural, economic, social, and political circumstances of the 
period? This thesis explores the compelling question by illustrating the transition of 
contemporary literary fiction (written in English) from modernist aesthetics and one-
sided national discourse into a culturally and politically driven postmodern form to 
parallel and reflect an increasingly global and globally aware 21st century. Through 
contemporary fiction's examination of neoliberal globalization - or perhaps what is 
also known as the postmodern condition and cultural logic of late capitalism - we 
come to understand a return of colonization in a world allegedly moving towards 
decolonization. What results is the Gramscian theory of hegemony, which gives rise 
to a Marxist theory of the transformation of social forces into forms of political power 
adequate to different class projects that depends on a very crucial factor - consensus. 
在過去的二十年中，隨著 1 9 8 9年的革命（以及之後突進的新自由主義經濟政 
策），信息和通信技術（ I C T ) 的擴散，世界經歷了急劇變化。但高等教育， 
尤其是英文文學研究有没有根據這一時期的文化、經濟、社會和政治的情況來 
修正呢？本論文探討從現代主義美學和片面國家論述的小說（英文書寫的）， 
過渡到一個文化和政治驅動並行的後現代形式，及反映一個日益全球化和全球 
意識的二十一世紀引人注目的問題。通過當代小說的新自由主義全球化的测試 
——或者也被稱為後現代的情况和晚期資本主義的文化邏輯——我們了解世界 
據稱走向非殖民化只不過掩飾另一種殖民方式，導致葛蘭西的霸權理論效果， 
使馬克思主義理論的社會力量轉變成促使不同階級的政治權力形式，取決於一 
個非常關鍵的因素 -共識。 
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 1 
Introduction 
 
“Globalization is always ethically ambiguous. Like all social practices, globalization 
is always structured as relations of power, and these relations of power – both structural and 
ideological – need to be analysed in the broadest possible way.” – Paul James 
 
Globalization is undoubtedly the buzzword towards the end of the twentieth 
century, which witnessed the collapse of communism in 1989, and will definitely 
continue to carry much weight throughout the global twenty-first century. According 
to John Urry, “1989 was also the year when the discourse of ‘globalization’ really 
took off, when exponential growth in the analyses of the global began to suggest that 
there was a putative global reconstitution of economic, political and cultural 
relationships” (DCGC 62) mediated by the onrush of neoliberalism, which was 
perpetuated by the Reagan and Thatcher governments. Thus, globalization, as we are 
experiencing it, is in many respects, not only new, but also revolutionary; it is of 
course economic, but also political, technological, and cultural. Urry writes, “[i]n 
some writings, the globalization thesis is an attempted reassertion of a modernist 
meta-narrative involving the claim that global markets generate economic, political 
and cultural homogenization” (66), while moving the world collectively towards 
democracy and modernity, or development. However, does globalization, in praxis, 
actually have a homogenizing effect – and if so, in what way? More importantly, is 
globalization for the better or worse of humanity? To put this tantalizing question in 
postmodern terms, does globalization move us towards the end of history, or are we 
witnessing a reversal of history within its global processes?  
According to the political scientist and economist, Francis Fukuyama, “the 
modern liberal democratic order represents the triumph of the principle of equal 
recognition over the relationship of lordship and bondage” (2012), such that people 
are recognized as equal human beings with dignity. David Harvey, however, explains 
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that “[t]he founding fathers of neoliberal thought [wisely] took political ideals of 
human dignity and individual freedom as fundamental, as ‘the central values of 
civilization’…for these are indeed compelling and seductive ideals” (BHN 5). These 
values, according to Harvey, were portrayed as basic rights “threatened not only by 
fascism, dictatorships, and communism, but by all forms of state intervention that 
substituted collective judgments for those of individuals free to choose” (5). This 
notion of freedom, however, is an illusion to justify a hegemony in which 
neoliberalism is conceived as the most viable economic principle cum political 
ideology for safeguarding democracy. According to Antonio Gramsci, hegemony 
“presupposes a certain collaboration, that is, an active and voluntary (free) consent; in 
other words, a liberal-democratic regime” (PN 9) that emphasizes the exercise and 
protection of the individual’s rights and liberties. Liberal democracy, in essence, is far 
from reaching the level of equality Fukuyama associates it with; and quite the 
contrary, liberal democracy is an agent of neoliberalism that assists in masking its 
inequalities by appearing to provide all with equal access and opportunities. Thus, 
there is an inherent contradiction between democracy and neoliberalism. Harvey 
writes, “[g]overnance by majority rule is seen as a potential threat to individual rights 
and constitutional liberties,” therefore, neoliberals “tend to favour governance by 
experts and elites,” thereby concentrating power within a remarkably small number of 
people (BHN 66). In other words, neoliberalization has “succeeded remarkably well in 
restoring, or in some instances (as in Russia and China) creating, the power of an 
economic elite” (19). While there has been a wave of decolonization since World War 
II, domination evidently remains prevalent in our globalized postmodern epoch which 
has seen intense expansions and modulations of capital leading to a concentration of 
power within the economic elite. For many parts of the world, the “post” in 
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postcolonial has barely arrived, but when it finally has, the colonial dimensions are 
still going strong. Thus, as Simon Gikandi writes, globalization and postcoloniality 
are correlative phenomena that “are perhaps two of the most important terms in social 
and cultural theory today” (2001). “Since the 1980s,” Gikandi writes, “they have 
functioned as two of the dominant paradigms for explaining the transformation of 
political and economic relationships in a world that seems to become increasingly 
interdependent with the passing of time, with boundaries that once defined national 
cultures becoming fuzzy” (29). 
While national claims seem increasingly insignificant and irrelevant in our 
globalized world where state intervention is undesirable, it is nevertheless necessary 
to have a government and a fabricated notion of nationhood to ensure the smooth 
running of a liberal democracy, or rather, neoliberalism. Harvey writes that “the 
neoliberal state needs nationalism of a certain sort to survive” because politically, it is 
“[f]orced to operate as a competitive agent in the world market and seek[s] to 
establish the best possible business climate” (85), and national traditions incidentally 
generate the common sense “constructed out of long-standing practices of cultural 
socialization” that “becomes ‘a button that elites can press to open the door to the 
masses’ to justify almost anything” (39). As such, the neoliberal state mobilizes 
nationalism to drive competition that “produces ephemeral winners and losers in the 
global struggle for position,” which, “in itself can be a source of national pride or of 
national soul-searching” (85). In short, neoliberalism needs nationalism to fuel 
people’s commitment and motivation to have a competitive edge in a world economy, 
and in turn, the prospect of being a winner in the global economy can be a source of 
pride which reflexively and perpetually drive people’s willing subjection to 
competition, and by extension, a division of labor. There are two key sites that 
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valorize this neoliberal project: the global – or informational - city, and cyberspace. 
According to Saskia Sassen “[i]n the current phase of the world economy, it is 
precisely the combination of the global dispersal of economic activities and global 
integration – under conditions of continued concentration of economic ownership and 
control – that has contributed to a strategic role for certain major cities” (CWE 4), 
which she coins as global cities. Manuel Castells and John Mollenkopf also 
emphasize that the “postindustrial era is no exception of a dominant class (in this case, 
the managerial technocracy allied to the global financial elite) which has a distinct 
spatial logic” because “[t]he interests and organizational powers of the new dominant 
class arise within a space of flows; that is, networks that transmit and facilitate the 
analysis of economically and politically relevant information” (DC 415). 
Theoretically, Castells asserts, “advanced telecommunications systems could make 
possible their scattered location around the globe” but “there has been a spatial 
concentration of the upper tier of such activities in a few nodal centers” (NS 410). 
Global cities are not only financial centers of the world economy but also 
informational centers, thus rendering these metropolises as a dual city. 
As Sassen, Castells, and Mollenkopf observe, global cities are strategic sites 
of global flows heavily dependent on (the speed of) advanced telecommunications 
systems that allow for the instantaneous and virtual dispersal of capital and 
information. While technology has a practical economic effect on the global economy, 
it also has a political one as cutting edge technological innovations are used to assess 
the competitive edge a nation has on the global stage. For instance, in a cry for 
America to reform its educational priorities, Norm Augustine explains: 
In a global, knowledge-driven economy there is a direct correlation between 
engineering education and innovation. Our success or failure as a nation will be 
measured by how well we do with the innovation agenda, and by how well we can 
advance medical research, create game-changing devices and improve the 
world…“These nations and many others have rightly concluded that the way to win 
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in the world economy is by doing a better job of educating and innovating. And 
America? We’re losing our edge. Innovation is something we’ve always been good at. 
Until now, we’ve been the undisputed leaders when it comes to finding new ideas 
through basic research, translating those ideas into products through world-class 
engineering, and getting to market first through aggressive entrepreneurship. (Forbes, 
Jan. 20, 2011) 
 
Augustine’s contention is clear, and not at all an uncommon one: innovation is the 
key to survival in an increasingly global economy, and falling behind in math and 
science education that encourages engineering necessitates a serious play of catch-up 
if a nation desires to wield power in the global economy. Augustine’s proposal for an 
emphasis on math and science education, thus, marks the desire for education to have 
full entry into neoliberalism. And we have, undoubtedly, witnessed educational 
institutions and particularly, universities, “changing in the direction of academic 
capitalism in the form of entrepreneurial McUniversities” (Lorenz 607) in which “the 
societal relevance of the universities” is “turned on its head to have economic 
relevance to business and industry in the knowledge society” (Lorenz 600). As a 
result, the American university model is exported overseas1 and online instruction is 
becoming an increasingly cost-efficient alternative to sitting in classrooms with a 
continuous worsening of the faculty/student ratio and temporary faculty. In a 
neoliberal state, according to Chris Lorenz, “[a]ll former state activities in the 
domains of education, social security, and health care can be privatized and 
commodified so that they can be made efficient and profitable” (602). In short, 
collective goods no longer exist, and the university – long considered the haven of 
academic freedom, intellectual curiosity, and the place where critical thinking skills 
and creativity are developed and refined – have fallen to neoliberal enterprises. Of 
course, transnationalism, innovation, and the idea of higher ed being easily and 
readily accessible through cloud computing all make our globalized economy and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 For instance, NYU in Abu Dhabi and Yale in Singapore alone have stirred up a lot of news and 
reaction both as a capitalist maneuver and for the uneven globalization of the American university 
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world phenomenal, but in fact, they simultaneously contribute to making the world a 
very disturbing place. 
 The global, knowledge-driven economy is a marketplace of perpetual 
competition for its actors to be economically and temporally ahead, and the university 
functions as an apparatus that produces individuals and/or groups of people who are 
subjects by playing the rules of this neoliberal game, or conversely, subjected by its 
uneven distributions. Paradoxically, it seems that only through time, is time 
conquered, but in a state’s trajectory towards conquering time, the spatial is neglected. 
Perhaps, then, neoliberal globalization and the global movement towards liberal 
democracies is not the end of history, but a reversal of history masked as an illusion 
of the end. In an alarming and chilling prose, Jean Baudrillard declares that “[w]e are 
faced with a paradoxical process of reversal, a reversive effect of modernity which, 
having reached its speculative limit and extrapolated all its virtual developments, is 
disintegrating into its simple elements in a catastrophic process of recurrence and 
turbulence” (IE 10). While I agree with Baudrillard that we are experiencing a 
“retroversion of history to infinity” (11), I believe there are redemptive acts and 
options that can, at the least, curb the indefinite retroversion of history that appears to 
have a fairly ‘obvious’ future that is purportedly technologically advanced and 
securely democratic with a rising level of education and culture. According to 
Raymond Williams, “in deeper ways, that have perhaps not yet been articulated, this 
idea of a good society naturally unfolding itself may be exceptionally misleading,” 
and that “the first difficulty lies in the common habit of supposing our society to be 
governed by single patterns, arrived at by averaging the overall trends in familiar 
categories of economic activity, political behavior and cultural development” (T2 25). 
It is true that, in our globalized world, we have increasingly reduced to quantifiable 
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measures in determining aptitude, as seen through the increased emphasis on 
standardized tests in education and cost-efficient model analyses in all areas of 
society. These quantifications, needless to say, are very limited in what and how they 
are measured, and as such, “we need quite different forms of analysis, which would 
enable us to recognize the important contradictions within each of the patterns 
described, and, even more crucially, the contradictions between different parts of the 
general process of change” in our society (Williams 25). If the glamorous economic 
and scientific prosperities have veiled the spatial discrepancies, including the uneven 
distribution of “the good life” which renders many as subjects and not citizens, and 
even the university is now reduced to an apparatus with a failing liberal education, 
what might address these spatial issues? Might literary fiction produce a space that 
critically broaches the spatial discrepancies found in temporal (perhaps even 
quantum) leaps taken in neoliberal globalization? 
The world has experienced rapid changes in the last twenty years concomitant 
of the Revolutions of 1989 (and the subsequent onrush of neoliberal economic 
policies) and the proliferation of Information and Communication Technology (ICT), 
but has higher education, and particularly, the study of English literature modified in 
accordance with the cultural, economic, social, and political circumstances of the 
period? This thesis explores the compelling question by illustrating the transition of 
contemporary literary fiction (written in English) from modernist aesthetics and one-
sided national discourse into a culturally and politically driven postmodern form to 
parallel and reflect an increasingly global and globally aware 21st century. Through 
contemporary fiction’s examination of neoliberal globalization – or perhaps what is 
also known as the postmodern condition and cultural logic of late capitalism – we 
come to understand a return of colonization in a world allegedly moving towards 
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decolonization. What results is the Gramscian theory of hegemony, which gives rise 
to a Marxist theory of the transformation of social forces into forms of political power 
adequate to different class projects that depends on a very crucial factor - consensus. 
I have argued that higher ed has taken a neoliberal turn and failed as liberal 
education, but I have yet addressed the English department’s contribution – despite 
the ‘progressive’ social and cultural leverages it claims to have in society – to the 
failing liberal education of universities. At a time when transnationalism is a buzz and 
the globe is collectively moving at a pace that can barely remember yesterday, many 
English departments across the world are still researching antediluvian cultural and 
social changes found in national literary texts and pedagogically reproducing cultural 
and social conventions of eras and nations that are now bygone, while largely 
ignoring the current conditions of our postmodern epoch. In doing so, I argue that 
these English departments are contributing to and reinforcing the cultural hegemony 
of national – namely British and American – literatures, and by extension the culture 
of these nations at large, that they primarily teach and research. In doing so, English 
departments preserve a certain timelessness to, thus privileging American and British 
cultural hegemonies, despite the shifts of power in geoeconomics, geoculture, and of 
course geopolitics. Immanuel Wallerstein pointedly asserts, “[o]ne of the basic 
structures of the capitalist world-economy is the cyclical rise and decline of 
‘hegemonies’ within the world-system” (GG 3). So, as Gramsci asked, “[w]hy should 
England have a certain hegemony over a set of countries based on certain traditional 
conditions that favored its superiority, if the United States can be superior to England 
and absorb it, together with its empire, if possible?” (PN 43), or conversely, why 
should the United States have a certain hegemony if China’s economy is about to 
surpass America’s? According to Gramsci, “[t]here is no ‘rationality’ in these matters, 
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but only questions of power” (43). This thesis examines three texts of contemporary 
literary fiction – Kazuo Ishiguro’s Remains of the Day, Hari Kunzru’s Transmission, 
and William Gibson’s Spook Country – all of which explores questions of power in a 
changing global economy. 
In chapter one, I discuss Remains of the Day’s portrayal of English society 
through the perspective of Mr. Stevens, an English butler, as the British empire wanes. 
Through Mr. Stevens, I examine the myth of the nation and the enduring quality (and 
necessity) of nationalism in spite of shifting power dynamics and a concomitant 
reconfiguration of social hierarchy in accordance with the economic and political 
changes of the era. According to David Harvey, “‘class’ is not a stable social 
configuration,” and “neoliberalization has been accompanied by a reconfiguration of 
what constitutes an upper class” (BHN 31). Although Britain agreed to decolonization 
and shed much of the mantle of its direct imperial power, Britain continued to 
“project a neocolonial presence throughout much of what had been its empire” with 
“London as a centre of international finance” as the “most important residual of 
Britain’s imperial presence” (Harvey 56), rather than the English country which 
represents and embodies an older tradition of Englishness. The transition from 
imperial power largely concentrated amongst aristocrats in the English country to a 
neocolonial presence relayed by transnational entrepreneurs and professionals who 
largely flourish in metropolitan centers suggests a transition from one dominant class 
to another that has greater aptitude and is more germane to an increasingly globalized 
world and economy. Accordingly, “[a] social and moral economy (sometimes 
supported by a strong sense of national identity) was fostered through the activities of 
an interventionist state” in which the “state in effect became a force field that 
internalized class relations” (Harvey 11). The idea of an English ethnicity and 
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nationalism stemmed from Britain’s imperial heritage, as revealed in Mr. Stevens’ 
narrative, contributed to Britain’s smooth internalizing of class relations. In light of 
Queen Elizabeth II’s Golden Jubilee celebrations in June 2012, ‘SofiaE3’ mockingly 
tweets that Englishness is “pretending you live in a democracy then celebrating an old, 
unelected head of state’s birthday with flag waving like fascists” (accessed on 
twitter.com on June 7, 2012). Indeed, politicians today, just as Mr. Stevens of 
Remains of the Day would rather talk about myths like Englishness than about the 
everyday life struggles of working class people in austerity because the 
ethnic/national myth ideologically interpellates citizens into becoming ‘willing’ 
subjects of a nationalist agenda (on the global front) and assenting to the hindrance of 
democracy. 
An increasing number of neoliberal economic policies were implemented just 
as Ishiguro was writing and publishing Remains of the Day, which renders the 
question of nations and nationalism par for the course of discussing social changes not 
only during a transitional period in history, but also during two seemingly disparate 
epochs (modernity/imperialism and postmodernity/globalization). According to Tom 
Nairn and Paul James, “[n]eo-liberal preaching saw only the lowering of borders, and 
nation-states losing former powers and status” which “was another way of affirming 
the all-importance of economics, and its supposed human by-product, ‘economic 
man’ and ‘woman’” (GM 12). “What emerges,” according to Masao Miyoshi, “is an 
increasingly tightly woven network of multinational investments among EC, North 
American, and East Asian countries, gradually transforming the multinational 
corporations into transnational corporations” (GL 86), in which “academia, the 
institution that might play the principal role in investigating transnational corporatism 
and its implications for humanity, seems all too ready to cooperate rather than 
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deliberate” (96). In chapter two, I argue that Hari Kunzru’s Transmission functions as 
a social and literary tool that unravels the inequities of postmodernity, in which there 
is a purported “growing awareness of the limits of the claims of the project of 
modernity” (Featherstone 59). “Put simply,” Mike Featherstone argues, 
“postmodernism points to the problem of handling cultural complexity” and “entails a 
loss of confidence in the master-narratives of progress and enlightenment which have 
been central to Western modernity” while witnessing “a democratization and 
popularization of forms of knowledge and cultural production and dissemination 
which were previously monopolized or tightly controlled by established groups” (GL 
59). Cyberspace has been popularized as the likely space where Featherstone’s 
utopian image of democratization occurs, as technology has proliferated the 
immediate transmission of information and knowledge. Everything is now a seamless 
web: change one detail and unexpected, sometimes monstrous transformations occur 
in other apparently unrelated zones of life, which is phenomenal, but also very 
disquieting at the same time. 
As Transmission illustrates, modernity is a game of catch-up dependent on 
and empowered by a nation’s ability to develop technological innovations and 
infrastructure where the “dissociation of space from place is further accelerated” and 
“the notion of time is replaced by that of speed” (Yoshimoto 115). Despite the 
lowering of borders and the weakening power of nation-states, nations are 
nevertheless germane in global and postmodern discourse. As I have argued, the 
global economy is a marketplace of perpetual competition between nations to 
quantitatively be ahead; hence, the emphasis on science, math, engineering, 
technology, and finance capital. In other words, despite globalization’s alleged 
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flattening effect, who you are and where you come from still matters. As Nairn and 
James argue, “[n]ationalism was global from the start” (GM 14).  
When Arjun Mehta, an IT specialist from India, fails to achieve social 
mobility in America, and correspondingly in India, both of which are now implicated 
in the global economy which is so densely networked according to the appropriations 
and needs of TNCs, he releases a far-reaching virus that entertains the possibility of 
turning the world upside down with the click of a mouse, suggesting the paradoxical 
dangers the Internet poses through its very advantages. In short, the temporal 
modernist agenda of development and progress has led to a postmodern flux of time-
space compression, in which “[f]or the purpose of shortening turnover time, image 
and spectacle have emerged as ideal commodities, which can be consumed and 
disappear instantaneously” (Yoshimoto 115). Cyberspace, just as “[t]he economy or 
the material base is,” is “increasingly ephemeral: profit is believed to be just a matter 
of manipulating numbers on a video display terminal” (115). The bearings of our 
social formations thus constantly elude us, but literary fiction captures them at a 
standstill for us to analyze and critically examine.  
In chapter three, I argue that while cyberspace is intangible and immaterial, it 
has a concrete manifestation in global cities, thereby reiterating the importance of 
location on multiple levels. Spook Country, through converging multiple narratives on 
an espionage plot, reveals the interconnectivity of our world, but also unveils and 
emphasizes the darker aspects of technocapitalism, as the current phase of late-
capitalism. While it is an axiom that high-technology firms and/or TNCs depend on 
financial resources to go on with their endless drive toward innovation, productivity, 
and competitiveness, we have yet to entirely acknowledge the absorption of national 
governments into neoliberalism, and thus, the conflation of economic and political 
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realities. As I argue in chapter three, the increasing influence and power of TNCs 
privilege intangibles such as creativity and knowledge, which is largely supported and 
enforced by local governments that one, take a backseat in the market, and two, 
ideologically interpellate citizens into believing that the developments and services 
offered by the TNCs will inevitably glamorize their city/state/country. Unfortunately, 
it is a misconception that all citizens will benefit from these developments. According 
to Miyoshi,  
It is not the nation as an integrated whole but certain classes, the privileged in it, that 
receive a major portion of benefits from the state performing these tasks. The state 
fails to satisfy most of its sectors and leaves most of its citizenry resentful. Thus, 
there is a palpable aversion to taxation among all segments of population, rich or poor, 
although everyone knows that tax is the glue that keeps the nation-state coherent. The 
nation-state, in this sense, no longer works; it is thoroughly appropriated by 
transnational corporations. (GL 92-3) 
 
Miyoshi goes on to argue that TNCs, run by a superclass, continue colonialism, and 
with the help of technology and bureaucracy sidestepped, TNCs are able to 
“rationalize and execute the objectives of colonialism with greater efficiency and 
rationalism” (96) than western imperialist countries were. 
In our postmodern condition, we are on the brink of a cultural, social, and 
political catastrophe without even fully realizing it because quantitative conceptions 
of globalization obscure our understandings along the illusion of progress. As I have 
broached in an earlier part of this introduction, literary fiction may offer an alternative 
understanding and approach to mainstream views of globalization. As F.R. Leavis has 
argued, “the trained frequentation of literature alone” can bring “insight into the 
relations between abstract and generalizing thought and the concrete human 
experience” and “thinking about political and social matters ought to be done by 
minds of some real literary education, and done in an intellectual climate informed by 
a vital literary culture” (11); in other words, literature can bring insight into the 
discursive social formations of our time that are not addressed, and perhaps are even 
 14 
masked by the illusion of development and progress. Remains of the Day, 
Transmission, and Spook Country are contemporary works of fiction that address the 
problematic cultural logic of our postmodern epoch and the paradoxical social 
formations and conceptions of globalization. Karl Marx and Friederich Engels 
claimed in 1848, “national one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and 
more impossible,” and as a result “from the many national and local literatures, a 
world literature arises” (CM 59). Marx and Engels’ 1848 proclamation resonates ever 
more so in the global 21st century, and yet, English departments have been 
unresponsive or very slow to respond to the changing circumstances of our era. Duke 
University’s Literature department, led by Fredric Jameson, and its objectives are 
perhaps the model for what literary studies ought to look like in a global and 
technologically advanced 21st century: 
The Literature Program seeks to rethink what comparison might mean in a world 
rapidly being altered by complex forces of economic and technological 
integration.  Although a focus on language, literature, and aesthetics continues to 
ground our work, we have pioneered by drawing together philosophical and 
theoretical reflections on the status of “literature” and “culture” with work in history, 
political economy, the sociology of culture, anthropology, visual culture, and cinema 
studies, all of which seeks to make sense of the complex factors affecting the 
historically changing nature of the relationship between society and culture. 
Literature has, in short, employed philosophical critique to interrogate and mediate 
our relationship to the social sciences thereby modeling a new kind of program in 
global studies from the perspective of the humanities, a program that recognizes that 
literature and culture are always crucially important agents in the understanding, 
definition and alteration of social formations. (Duke Program in Literature website) 
 
If literature and literary studies continue to have the cultural, social, and political 
value Leavis claimed in 1943, English departments ought to reform their curriculum 
and research to address the changes in society and meet the changing needs of our 
world by emphasizing world literature, or at least, literature that explores the cultural 
and social conditions of our time.  
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I 
 
Nationalism, Identity, and the Decline of Empire in Remains of the Day 
 
 
 It would be too simplistic a notion to say that literature is purely aesthetic. 
Kazuo Ishiguro’s Remains of the Day (1989) is exemplary of how historical and 
political contexts matter in both the production and interpretation of a novel. 
Literature is historical because it is a cultural embodiment of the social and political. 
Although Remains of the Day takes place during the decline of the British Empire, 
politics of the empire and its past and the binary between the colonized and colonizer 
are undeniably prevalent and indispensable as ghostly, but problematized, elements in 
the identity construction of its narrator and protagonist, Mr. Stevens. Mr. Stevens’ 
idée fixe of what it is to be a professional and dignified English butler profoundly 
affects how he understands himself as a whole. Ishiguro’s narrative style, according to 
Rebecca Walkowitz, “evoke[s] national attributes, whose recognition among readers 
tends to situate his texts within particular cultural traditions,” which is true of “the 
apparent Englishness” found in Mr. Stevens (ELH 109). Ranging from his love life 
(or lack thereof), to his treatment of his father when in time of need, to the most 
mundane aspects of his daily life, Stevens’ unyielding professionalism, ethic of 
service, and personal reserve represent all that was best about the English butler in an 
English society that is bygone. Of course, we know that this defunct English society 
was a feudal one, which would have rendered Mr. Stevens as a powerless and 
voiceless subject already at birth, thereby problematizing the dialectic of the 
colonized and colonizer as a power relation not exclusively embedded as a 
geopolitical question of one nation colonizing another nation and/or region, but also 
as a question that emerges in local class distinctions.  
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Although Mr. Stevens is English himself, he is ultimately portrayed as an 
Other to his long-time employer, Lord Darlington, as well as Darlington’s company. 
Mr. Stevens, however, is not conscious of the arbitrary constructs comprising his 
identity; as an interpellated subject whose knowledge and experiences remain entirely 
within the confines of Darlington Hall and the feudal, anti-Semitic landlords he serves, 
he thinks that being a part of the estate is already of the greatest honor. If Mr. 
Stevens’ knowledge and world is limited to that of being a great butler in Darlington 
Hall, then it is beyond question that his notion of what it means to be English and 
perhaps even an individual is delimited to his professional identity. The irony, 
however, is that the dignity and respectability he associates with his professional 
identity is far removed from the reality of his social class. As dignified as he believes 
English butlers carry themselves out to be in their vocational roles, they are 
nevertheless of a subaltern class. This chapter examines Remains of the Day as a 
novel of manners, revealing identity as a product of historical processes of 
performativity and pedagogy, through which the novel form itself becomes 
performative, pedagogical, historical, thus political.  
 
1989 and 1956: Historical Contexts 
 
 R.S. Crane argues that literary history is essentially part of “the general history 
of culture” (20). If literary history is part of cultural history, what is the significance 
of Ishiguro’s publication of Remains of the Day in 1989? And why did Ishiguro write 
about a time period that seems so irrelevant to what was happening in the 1980s? As 
we all know, 1989 saw various events emblematic of communism’s collapse, which 
led to an immediate onrush of neoliberal economic policies. However, Reaganomics 
and Thatcherism throughout the 80s were already revitalizing laissez-faire economic 
policies that increased privatization and allowed the period to see great social and 
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economic change as multinational corporations began moving their industries 
overseas. The spread of neoliberalism, thus, resulted in an increase of transnational 
flows – from finance and human capital, to information and knowledge – which has 
facilitated globalization and ipso facto contributed to the current phase of late 
capitalism. Globalization, in theory, weakens nationalism and nation-states and 
replaces them with cosmopolitanism and multinational corporations. In Tom Nairn 
and Paul James’ words, “[n]eo-liberal preaching saw only the lowering of borders, 
and nation-states losing former powers and status” (GM 12). Furthermore, the fall of 
communism led to the balkanization of the Soviet Union, the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, which also raises questions of nationalism and the 
role and division of empire and nation-states. It is vis-à-vis the alleged waning of 
nationalism and diminishing power of nation-states, and the decline of empire that 
renders the 1980s in which Ishiguro was writing Remains of the Day a parallel to the 
1950s in which the novel is set. 
Remains of the Day takes place during the war and up to 1956. This date 
provides a critical historical context to properly understand the novel: Egypt’s 
decision to nationalize the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956 marked the symbolic end of 
the British empire and influence, as the canal was a strategic intersection which 
shortened the route between Asia and Europe for trade and military positioning, thus a 
sort of highway for the British empire. The struggles of Britain to wield power and 
control in the Suez Canal Crisis marked its fall as an African colonizer and also 
contributed to the emergence of the United States as a superpower, which had taken 
an isolationist foreign policy in the Middle East prior to the Suez Crisis.  
Ishiguro’s choice of this historical context is twofold: first and foremost, it 
emphasizes the obsolete cultural (and thus, national) context of Englishness in light of 
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the end of empire, which indicates that the greatness of Britain has passed. Therefore, 
the dismantling of Britain’s colonial empire undoubtedly provides a determining 
historical context for the characters’ attitudes and aspirations, for incidentally, it is 
during the time of the Suez Crisis that Mr. Stevens endeavors on an “expedition” 
(Ishiguro 3) to England’s countryside as an attempt to see more of his country. He 
explains that it is under his new employer’s recommendation to do so, as he recalls 
Mr. Farraday’s inquiry: “You fellows [(butlers)], you’re always locked up in these big 
houses helping out, how do you ever get to see around this beautiful country of 
yours?” (Ishiguro 4). As a butler of an estate as large as Darlington Hall’s, Mr. 
Stevens is undoubtedly confined to the limits of the property with his extensive 
household duties. However, he claims, “although we did not see a great deal of the 
country in the sense of touring the countryside…[we] did actually ‘see’ more of 
England than most” (4), which oddly enough, is probably true.  
Although Mr. Stevens is only a butler, which renders him an unlikely 
character with too insignificant of a role in English society to consider as a 
personification of Englishness (or English nationalism), as in the case of the 'Suez 
Crisis', there is a great deal that is 'in but not in', or 'in by not being in'. The historical 
event of the Suez Crisis has a powerful presence in the novel, in spite of its absence as 
a direct allusion, which shapes and impacts the characters and constrains the narrative 
within a specific historical context. So while Mr. Stevens may at best be only dimly 
aware of that which is outside his experience, even when referring to his own little 
corner of England – the experiences he encounters as a butler and his methodological 
performance of his role as a butler intimate a great deal about English society and 
culture, which qualifies significant aspects of the novel's reflection on England as 
comprehensive and legitimate. Although Mr. Stevens believes that “a butler’s duty is 
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to provide good service” and “is not to meddle in the great affairs of the nation” 
because “such great affairs will always be beyond the understanding of those such as 
you and I” (Ishiguro 199), his position as a butler is significant to understanding the 
construct of English culture, nationalism and nationhood precisely through his willing 
subordination and subjection, and pantomimic performance of cultural practices 
necessitated by his trade. For instance, Mr. Stevens states, “those of us who wish to 
make our mark must realize that we best do so by concentrating on what is within our 
realm” (199), thereby conceding a deficiency and gap of knowledge informed by his 
recognition of his inferiority and subordination, which he readily accepts. Yet, at the 
same time, he sees that being a servant can affect humanity at large by “devoting [his] 
attention to providing the best possible service to those great gentlemen in whose 
hands the destiny of civilization truly lies” (199). The assumption that these “great 
gentlemen” are the paragons of civilization deludes Mr. Stevens into believing that he, 
too, can play a role in contributing to human development and progress by subjecting 
himself to these men, when quite the contrary, his willing subjection merely 
reinforces a power dynamic that by all means, obstructs any notion of progress and 
enlightenment. Yet, to ostensibly digress and to return to the initial concern, what 
might a butler have to teach us about English culture and society? 
The Myth of the Nation and Its Dissemination 
In an interview, Kazuo Ishiguro explains, “for a long, long time Britain 
thought of itself as the center of a huge empire” which allowed the British to “write 
about the smallest details of English society,” which “was, by definition, of interest to 
people in the far corners of the world because English culture itself was something 
that was internationally important” (2000). In Remains of the Day, we see Mr. 
Stevens subscribing to this notion that England is at the center of the world through 
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his reflection on the most minute and mundane details of his servanthood. In 
reflecting and writing on these details, a certain degree of import is allocated to 
information that would otherwise be deemed as trivial. This allocation functions to 
emphasize the existence of a cultural hegemony – even such seemingly 
inconsequential and banal particulars should have an edge in global cultural 
production such that people around the world recognize the banalities of the English 
butler as quintessentially emblematic of Englishness, but ironically, idolize these very 
banalities. However, at the time Mr. Stevens embarks on his journey through the 
English country, England is no longer at the center of the world. Be that as it may, 
England nevertheless established compelling cultural norms and practices that were 
not easily and entirely jettisoned in light of changing (geo)political circumstances. 
These cultural norms and practices, thus, become historical and political by lingering 
like ghosts haunting a changing and different society (and world) from the one they 
emanated from. According to Ishiguro, “[t]he whole attitude to what ‘English’ means 
has undergone a huge change since I was a child in England” (2000). According to 
Ishiguro, the British began to realize that they are “not the center of the universe” and 
“that Britain wasn't the heart of an Empire, but just a little -- albeit a powerful one, 
still -- just a little country” (2000). It is precisely this change – the decentering of 
England and its signifiers – that Mr. Stevens, struggles with. Throughout the novel, 
Mr. Stevens is fixed in old English ideals of professional code of conduct, dignity, 
and reserve that renders him as the perfect English subject; in this way, Mr. Stevens 
illustrates Englishness as a performative concept. But what exactly qualifies as 
English? In other words, who or what determines Englishness? 
In Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson argues that nations are created, 
or constructed, culturally. He writes, “nationality…nation-ness, as well as nationalism 
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are cultural artefacts” and in order to “understand them properly we need to consider 
carefully how they have come into historical being” (4). This is because national 
identity, as Robert Eaglestone explains, “affects how you behave, your expectations, 
your relations with others…how you understand the world and your place in it” (121). 
Mr. Stevens claims that the greatest butlers “wear their professionalism as a decent 
gentleman will wear his suit,” as if butlers were actors and being a good butler is 
something performed (43). He observes, “being a butler is like playing some 
pantomime role” and that “great butlers are great by virtue of their ability to inhabit 
their professional role and inhabit it to the utmost” (42-3). Stevens is thoroughly 
subsumed and consumed by his professional identity as a butler, which is clearly 
performative. His ideas and behavior are arguably performances that construct his 
identity, as a professional English butler as well as an individual; and since his 
identity is performative, it is a cultural construct, which involves historical processes. 
In fact, his professional identity is arguably inseparable from his national identity. He 
boldly asserts, “Continentals are unable to be butlers because they are as a breed 
incapable of the emotional restraint which only the English race are capable of,” 
which essentializes and thus, foregrounds issues of nation and national identification 
(43). Not only is Stevens’ context limited to Darlington Hall and imperial Britain, but 
his professional and national identity seem inseparable and indistinguishable. For 
Stevens, the characteristics, namely restraint - something that butlers from elsewhere 
apparently lack – a professional English butler exhibits invariably corresponds with 
the fact that he is English. That is to say, Mr. Stevens believes that being English 
alone inherently equips a person with certain traits and characteristics that renders 
him superior to those of other nationalities. As a professional English butler, then, Mr. 
Stevens regards himself as quintessentially English, and a part of what Homi Bhabha 
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refers to as “disjunctive forms of representation that signify a people, a nation, or a 
national culture” (NN 292). By regarding himself as quintessentially English, he 
becomes an embodiment of English culture, thus a cultural artifact of England as a 
country and nation. 
Mr. Stevens is effectively a manifestation of a “complex rhetorical strategy” 
where “the people are the historical ‘objects’ of a nationalist pedagogy” (NN 297). As 
someone who is shaped by the English culture through language, history, location, 
and even his profession (all of which were taught to and imposed upon him, and none 
of which were innate traits or knowledge), Mr. Stevens is undoubtedly an object of 
his nation and culture. Further, Bhabha contends, “the people are also the ‘subjects’ of 
a process of signification…in which the national life is redeemed and signified as a 
repeating and reproductive process” (NN 297). By being subjected to his national 
culture, Mr. Stevens also becomes a subject to the English culture by reproducing and 
performing the habits, traits, and knowledge he has been taught that delineates 
Englishness. By being a subject of his national culture, Mr. Stevens, once again, 
becomes a cultural object or embodiment that signifies the English nationality. As 
Bhabha elaborates, “the scraps, patches, and rags of daily life must be repeatedly 
turned into the signs of a national culture” (NN 297). In Remains of the Day, we 
undoubtedly encounter sundries of Mr. Stevens’ “scraps, patches, and rags of daily 
life” as an English butler, as if these particulars are significant more than they are 
trivial. The magnification of such mundane details of Mr. Stevens’ life is suggestive, 
as he is a servant, which positions him in a class, which by no means, is respectable or 
esteemed according to conventional social standards, of course, depending on whose 
conventions one is observing. Yet the entire novel is framed around Stevens’ life and 
self-respect as an English butler, and this certainly provides a fresh and crucial 
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context for understanding Englishness as a cultural construct; for it is not an accident 
that Ishiguro has limited Stevens’ knowledge and thoughts within this context.  
For Mr. Stevens, serving “the greatest ladies and gentlemen of the land” has 
given him the “privilege to see the best of England over the years” (Ishiguro 4), which 
is certainly true if we consider the cultural practices of the privileged class under the 
British Empire “the best of England.” It is clear that Mr. Stevens’ ideology is rather 
affixed to a culture fabricated by the dominating class of that era, and that his 
understanding and knowledge of the world is limited to the perception that he had 
“seen it all” by remaining in one small corner of his country – which is incidentally 
only one small corner of the entire world – and in believing that he has in fact “seen it 
all” under employment of Lord Darlington, he becomes an instrument of cultural 
hegemony and a subject of cultural imperialism. His engagements as a butler, then, 
unquestionably impact the way he thinks as an individual. While Mr. Stevens assumes 
that whatever he sees and experiences at Darlington Hall is universally true, the novel 
contrarily suggests that his assumptions – by the very fact that they are assumptions – 
alone already implicitly challenge notions of truth and reality, and by extension, 
identity and its establishment. The novel, thus, foregrounds the question of Mr. 
Steven’s identity construction – be it personal, occupational, or national – and 
whether these multiple subject positions can be conflated into one identity to appear 
cogent for the greater purpose of fabricating a coherent national identity. Anderson 
argues, “the ‘nation’ proved an invention on which it was impossible to secure a 
patent” precisely because the “nation” is a myth (IC 4). This becomes increasingly 
evident as the novel progresses and Mr. Stevens encounters different instances that 
challenge what it means to be “English.”  
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To complicate matters further, readers are only immediately provided with Mr. 
Stevens’ perspective and reflections throughout the novel, which promptly raises the 
question of narrative reliability, and to what extent we can trust his narrative. 
According to Robert Eaglestone, characters like Mr. Stevens’ typically tell us “what 
[they] think is important, and what [they] think is going on” (DE 103-4, emphasis 
mine). Certainly, Stevens is extremely biased in that he has developed a deep 
attachment and “profound emotional legitimacy” (Anderson 4) in terms of what it 
means to be English, or particularly, what it means to be a dignified English butler; 
which, of course, is a very limited perspective. For instance, Mr. Stevens reflects on a 
time when he overheard Darlington Hall’s housekeeper, Miss Kenton, cry over her 
dead aunt, which “provoked a strange feeling to rise within [him]” (176), and caused 
him “to stand there hovering in the corridor for some moments” (177). Stevens is 
clearly perturbed by Miss Kenton’s grief as he was “preoccupied for some hours” 
giving “particular thought to the question of what [he] might best do or say to ease her 
burden a little” (177). In the end, however, he “judged it best to await another 
opportunity to express [his] sympathy and went on [his] way” (177). Yet, when 
another opportunity rose, he merely had a “professional discussion” (177) with Miss 
Kenton regarding new staff members at Darlington Hall and refrained from providing 
her with any consolation for her grief whatsoever. This is an obvious instance in 
which Mr. Stevens performs and exhibits “emotional restraint”; as mentioned earlier, 
he claims that this trait distinguishes Continentals from English butlers. In this 
specific instance, his behavior is a result of repeated cultural practices, and it 
supersedes his human sensibility and empathy to comfort Miss Kenton when in time 
of need. When his reflection comes to an end, Mr. Stevens observes, “I have drifted 
considerably from the account I was giving of this evening’s events” (180), 
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suggesting that moment with Miss Kenton as a notable moment in his life, thereby 
indicating some level of faint consciousness in how inhibiting his pursuit of being a 
proper English butler has been on his private life. Although the days he shared with 
Miss Kenton at Darlington Hall are long gone, Mr. Stevens evidently excessively, and 
often unconsciously, reflects upon those “glorious” days at the estate. It is as if he 
cannot sequester himself from Darlington Hall and anything and everything 
associated with the place and era it thrived in; Mr. Stevens is trapped and confined 
emotionally and mentally in the past, because the only culture he knows is one from 
the past, and this culture, which has now changed, is tied to the very essence of who 
he is as an individual.  
Be that as it may, an “essential element of the power of nationalism,” Anthony 
D. Smith contends, is “its chameleon-like ability to transmute itself” (NN 13). While I 
agree with Smith that nationalism is powerful enough to endure in spite of challenges 
it may face for any given reason and that it can and will change under different epochs 
because of varying political and economic reasons, Mr. Stevens clearly and staunchly 
identifies with something that no longer is, and is incapable of transmuting according 
to varying circumstances. Mr. Stevens’ faithfulness to the domestic cultural artefacts 
of imperial Britain, I argue, reflects on how penetrating the nationalist discourse of 
that epoch was – so much so that Mr. Stevens’ is so thoroughly interpellated that he 
becomes a ghost of that period that lingers in post-imperial Britain.  
Conflating Identities, Uncanny Doubling  
Not only is Stevens confined emotionally and mentally in the past, but he is 
also constricted in his physical appearance. When “the question of what sorts of 
costume were appropriate” for his journey, Mr. Stevens says, “I am in the possession 
of a number of splendid suits, kindly passed on to me over the years by Lord 
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Darlington himself” (Ishiguro 10). Stevens’ repetitive use of the term “costume” for 
his dress is suggestive, almost as if he himself is aware that he lacks a personal and 
private identity beyond that of an English butler in a “revered” household. The 
possession of Darlington’s suits allows him to mimic his master, thus assume 
gentility; when he puts on Darlington’s garments, he effectively puts on the costume 
of a gentleman, which allows him to falsely believe that is he, too, is of a higher-grade. 
This illusion, of course, is an effective rhetorical strategy to maintain Mr. Stevens’ 
unswerving loyalty and dedication to Lord Darlington, and by extension, the English 
aristocracy, which was (and arguably still is, albeit under a different guise) the 
dominating class of English culture, society and government. Mr. Stevens is 
undoubtedly a cultural and political embodiment of a particular role (subaltern and 
colonized class) in a particular country (England) during a particular historical period 
(British imperialism). 
Writing about colonial enterprises in Africa, Mahmood Mamdani asserts that 
Britain “was the first to realize that key to an alien power’s achieving a hegemonic 
domination was a cultural project: one of harnessing the moral, historical, and 
community impetus behind local custom to a larger colonial project” (CS 286). If 
Britain realizes that hegemonic domination is necessarily a cultural project abroad, 
she certainly realizes it at home as well. Colonization, then, is problematized as its 
execution is not limited to geopolitical issues abroad, but is also a prevailing problem 
in class concerns at home. Consider Mr. Stevens’ diction when he uses the term 
“costume,” which implies a theatrical element, to describe his attire. The Oxford 
English Dictionary defines costume as a “a set of clothes in a style typical of a 
particular country or historical period” or “a set of clothes worn by an actor or other 
performer for a particular role.” Although dressing himself in Lord Darlington’s suits 
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may allow Mr. Stevens to assume gentility, it is not a costume that deceives everyone. 
At Mortimer’s Pond, Mr. Stevens comes across a chauffeur who is able to distinguish 
him as “one of them top-notch butlers” (Ishiguro 119). The chauffeur explains that 
because Stevens “talk[s] almost like a gentleman” (119), but not quite, his appearance 
is very misleading from his professional identity and the position he holds in society. 
After the chauffeur makes multifarious comments on how “posh” (119) the Ford and 
Darlington Hall are, he inquires whether Stevens “actually used to work for that Lord 
Darlington?” (120). Stevens surprisingly responds, “[o]h no, I am employed by Mr. 
John Farraday, the American gentleman who bought the house from the Darlington 
family” (120). Stevens’ response suggests that he may be faintly cognizant of the 
ignominy associated with the bygone glory of those who prospered under the British 
Empire (or those who dabbled in Nazism). Unfortunately, Stevens happens to be a 
product of that zeitgeist. 
As far as readers are concerned, everything he knows revolves around 
Darlington Hall. Because this is so, his thoughts and manners are products of that 
environment. In this way, he appears to be like a gentleman but in actuality, he is 
merely a servant – a proletariat, so to speak. Interestingly, Mr. Stevens’ manners and 
appearance render him a mimesis of Lord Darlington as much as his historical 
embodiment is a mimicry of aristocratic English culture. Homi Bhabha asserts, 
“colonial mimicry is the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, as a subject of a 
difference that is almost the same, but not quite” (LC 122). Mr. Stevens’ situation is 
extremely uncanny; he exhibits the manners of a gentleman, but is not classified as 
one because again, he is of the servant class.  
When the car ran out of gas during Mr. Steven’s journey through a small part 
of the English countryside, he becomes stranded and encounters villagers near 
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Tavistock, Devon. Stevens’ beneficent host, Mr. Taylors, tells him “[y]ou can tell a 
true gentleman from a false one that’s just dressed in finery. Take yourself, sir. It’s 
not just the cut of your clothes, nor is it even the fine way you’ve got speaking” (185). 
Finally, Mr. Taylor declares, “[t]here’s something else that marks you out as a 
gentleman” (185). Of course, these comments reflect Mr. Taylor’s ignorance, but the 
fact that Mr. Stevens does not bother to correct him indicates that Stevens feels that 
he indeed possesses traits of a gentleman. He proposes that “dignity” (185), once 
performed, signifies a gentleman. Ironically, this proposition reveals Stevens’ own 
ignorance, for his understanding of what it means to be a gentleman is constructed by 
what Lord Darlington superficially appeared to be. However, Darlington’s distinction 
and prestige has more to do with the class he was born into, rather than how he carries 
himself. Be that as it may, by reproducing and performing the superficial manners 
Lord Darlington possessed, Mr. Stevens misconceives that he, too, is of a superior 
breed, thus willingly subjects himself to the aristocracy’s hegemony. Nevertheless, 
Mr. Stevens seems to show little to no concern for his uncanny situation as a mimesis 
that will never be complete. While he does exhibit certain aristocratic traits because 
his environment is pedagogical (he repeats and performs what he sees and knows), it 
does not equate to being an original. At best, Mr. Stevens is very similar to a “classic 
English gentleman,” but not quite. Little does he know, he is merely a strange, but 
incomplete, double of Lord Darlington. 
Ideological State Apparatuses  
 
Mr. Stevens’ identity is certainly ambivalent and strange, as he is a gentleman 
in appearance and conduct, but at the same time, he really is not a gentleman in 
accordance with his social standing. Remains of the Day, thus, is not a novel simply 
about a butler in an aristocratic household that flourished when Britain’s empire did 
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as it so too, declined when the empire declined. Instead, the novel examines how the 
dynamic between the dominant and powerful class and the lower or subaltern class, 
exemplified by Lord Darlington and Mr. Stevens, duplicates very precisely England’s 
relationship with its colonies; thereby problematizing the relationship between the 
colonized and colonizer, which is traditionally based on race. As argued, Mr. Stevens 
is a mimesis of Lord Darlington, and yet, he is also Darlington’s willing servant and 
inferior. The relationship between the two certainly has its analogies with that 
between the colonized and colonizer, yet perhaps also with a significant difference. 
Hierarchy, for example, is no longer justified by race alone. Does this then post 
limitations to a post-colonial reading of the novel, or has the postcolonial novel 
transmuted because culture and society has been greatly impacted by neoliberal 
economic and globalizing trends of the 1980s and onwards?  
Mr. Stevens is the apotheosis of the perfect manservant who obliterates all 
traces of his own personality, all instinctive drives and desires, all individual dreams 
in the service of his master. Mr. Stevens’ eradictation of any individuality is 
particularly evident when his father passes away. When Miss Kenton asked Mr. 
Stevens whether he would like to take a moment to see his father, he brusquely replies, 
“I’m very busy just now” (106) and returns to the smoking room to assist 
Darlington’s fascist guests. Interestingly, Mr. Stevens’ willingness and readiness to be 
subjected as an English butler emanates from his family, a presumably private sphere, 
as his father was also a butler. His father, then, becomes an agent of an ideological 
state apparatus (ISA) – the family. To consider something as private as the family as 
an ISA to interpellate subservient and deferential convictions relevant to the 
nationalist ideology fabricated by the ruling class is indeed a very perturbing thought. 
As Benedict Anderson argues, however, the “nation” is “something capable of being 
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consciously aspired to from early on” (IC 67). In Mr. Stevens’ case, it is not as simple 
as him being the son of a butler, as he also consciously strives to live up to the ideal 
of service achieved by his father; and living up to this ideal reifies his Englishness. He 
narrates, with great pride, one particular incident in his father’s life that epitomizes 
the celebrated British sense of “self-restraint.” Mr. Stevens’ father was informed by 
his master that a general who was responsible for the unnecessary deaths of a large 
number of young men, Mr. Stevens’ brother included, during the Boer war is 
expected at a luncheon. Mr. Stevens’ father, ever dutiful, suffered “the intimate 
proximity for four days with the man he detests” (42) and volunteered to act as valet 
to the general because he recognized that “his employer’s business aspirations hung 
on the smooth running of the house party” (41). The irony of this self-abasement, 
seemingly unnoticed by Mr. Stevens and his father, is that the business interest is 
utterly unsavory – illegal arms dealing – and neither father nor son question whether 
their sacrifices are for a worthy or justified cause. Instead, they carry on with 
“dignity” as perfect butlers who practice self-restraint.  
The classic English butler is, thus, the perfect manservant and the ideal 
nationalist, devoid of all individuality and instinctive drives and desires, the mimesis 
with the “correct” accent, and of course, the “correct” manners. Mr. Stevens’ 
impeccable performance of an English butler is pervasive in all aspects of his life. 
Even when he reads recreationally, it is for work-related purposes and not leisure. 
When Miss Kenton caught Mr. Stevens reading a sentimental romance, he explained, 
“it was an extremely efficient way to maintain and develop one’s command of the 
English language” (167). Mr. Stevens explains that there is a “professional 
desirability of good accent and command of language” (167-8), which conflates 
occupational eligibility with cultural competency such that one must exhibit, perform, 
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and reproduce certain cultural norms of the nation to qualify as a desirable servant. 
Further, Mr. Stevens explains, “butlers of any quality must be seen to inhabit his role” 
and “cannot be seen casting it aside…as though it were nothing more than a 
pantomime costume” (169). The metaphors of acting, of clothing, reveal how much 
Stevens’ notions derive from deeply entrenched British traditions. The British class 
system makes such role playing mandatory as every individual is expected to perform 
the role assigned to him/her at birth. A crucial element of such acting is the rigorous 
subjection of the private self to the demands of the public person. As Althusser 
proclaims, we “are always already subjects” (1503) because ideology, vis-à-vis 
ideological state apparatuses  “drums into [people]…a certain amount of ‘know-how’ 
wrapped in the ruling ideology” (1494). However, the drumming in of the correlation 
between possessing the desired qualifications and the ability to perform professionally 
deludes the subjected class into believing that they are part of a meritocracy. While 
the illusion of performing professionally in a meritocracy may disguise as an act of 
free choice and justify a sense of dignity and superiority in the likes of Mr. Stevens, in 
actuality, it is ideological interpellation that misguides and misleads the working class 
into believing that they have free choice with the aim that it appears as if they 
willingly reproduce certain ideologies and norms, rather than being subjected within 
existing power relations and by ruling class ideology. 
The Hayes Society is yet another ideological state apparatus that functions to 
preserve ruling class ideology. Because the society claimed exclusivity, and admitted 
butlers of “only the very first rank” (Ishiguro 31), it “managed to keep its numbers 
extremely low” (32) thereby establishing imaginary power and prestige. The Hayes 
Society “did not regard the houses of businessmen or the ‘newly rich’ as 
‘distinguished’” and “a prerequisite for membership was that ‘an applicant be 
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attached to a distinguished household’” (32). Not only is it necessary for an applicant 
to be attached to a well-respected and prominent household, but the family’s prestige 
must also derive from old money. Through its illusive power and prestige, the Hayes 
Society manipulates individuals into aspiring towards these standards for what a great 
butler ought to be, and in doing so, produces individuals who are willingly subjected 
to both the aristocracy and national culture, insofar that the two correspond to one 
another. This suggests that the ideology behind the Society is an artificial construct 
fabricated to perpetuate uneven power relations, and is also historical because of its 
discursive formation and attachment to the British class system during a specific time 
period in British history. As Mr. Stevens explains, most people in post-imperial 
Britain are not “aware of the Hayes Society, for few talk of it these days” (31) 
because the society is an ISA of a bygone era’s ruling class ideology, which is no 
longer relevant, not so much because the power structure collapsed with the decline of 
empire, but because power and influence have shifted from the aristocracy – which 
has particular cultural practices – to the (American) new rich which operates 
differently despite reproducing a power structure.  
 
Reifying and the Deconstruction of Identity 
 
Althusser asserts that ideology “always expresses class positions” (1496) 
because “all ideology hails or interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects” 
(1504) through their social roles. The limitations of Mr. Stevens’ understanding of 
himself as an English butler goes hand in hand with his social standing in the lower 
class, thereby expressing his class position. When he performs his duties as a “great” 
(Ishiguro 33) butler, he becomes a concrete subject because his performances put his 
ideology into practice, and thereby materializes the ideology and his own existence as 
a subject. Therefore, only when he is performing as a classic English butler, and 
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hailed as one, does he feel that his existence and identity are concrete. Jonathan Culler 
explains, “[t]he English word subject already encapsulates this key theoretical 
program: the subject is an actor or agent, a free subjectivity that does things, as in the 
‘subject of a sentence’. But a subject is also subjected”  (109). For Althusser, this 
paradox of both free choice and subjection that occurs simultaneously, offers a double 
mirror-connection crucial to establishing identity, and by extension, power relations, 
because multiple recognitions occur. The subject recognizes himself as an individual 
with “free will” who thus willingly subjects himself to ruling class ideology, which 
incidentally implies a mutual recognition of difference, whether the subjected 
individual is fully cognizant of the differences, which implies the existence of a 
hierarchy. Recall that Mr. Stevens believes himself to be of a superior class because 
of his affinity with Lord Darlington, despite his illusive power to manipulate the 
subjected to remain colonized without any cognition that he has been 
comprehensively colonized. 
Throughout the novel, Mr. Stevens is portrayed as a character who lacks 
agency, and is always subjected and a subject. His concerns entirely revolve around 
providing first-class service at Darlington Hall to Lord Darlington, and all its guests 
whom Mr. Stevens regards as worthy and important on the premise that they are high-
ranking, well-connected, prominent and distinguished persons, which at the time 
meant aristocrats or those who were well-connected to the aristocracy. Mr. Stevens’ 
encounter with said persons, as mentioned earlier, undoubtedly requires him to 
assume and perform specific roles and responsibilities to reproduce a power structure 
in which they have cultural and ideological hegemony.  
The mannerisms a professional and dignified English butler ought to perform 
and mimic are aristocratic conventions that purport to symbolize national culture, but 
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this only accentuates Mr. Stevens’ position as a subject of the aristocracy and country, 
and an Other to his master. “‘[O]therness’,” Bhabha writes, “is at once an object of 
desire and derision” (OQ 19). Since Mr. Stevens is an effective and persuasive 
mimesis of the aristocracy’s mannerisms, he threatens “the fantasy of [their] origin 
and identity” (OQ 19), so they must clearly construct and distinguish Mr. Stevens as 
an Other to stabilize their own identity as the superior, the colonizers, while retaining 
Mr. Stevens’ loyalty, dedication, and above all, amenability. When Mr. Spencer, one 
such individual who assumes that Mr. Stevens is likely to be unknowledgeable in all 
aspects outside of servanthood, incessantly questions Mr. Stevens on foreign policy, 
Mr. Stevens’ only response is “I’m very sorry, sir, but I am unable to be of assistance 
on this matter” (Ishiguro 195). It is possible that Mr. Stevens might have been able to 
provide some sort of informed response to Mr. Spencer’s foreign policy questions, but 
the novel stresses that he chooses to not even consider doing so because he knows 
what is wanted of him, so he intones this standard reply repeatedly rather like a parrot, 
much to the gratification of Lord Darlington and his Nazi friends. This would 
otherwise be an extremely embarrassing moment for Mr. Stevens if he was in fact a 
dignified and autonomous individual who is merely resigned to an acquiescent and 
passive persona at that moment to capitulate to those who society regard as superior; 
but because Mr. Stevens was always already a subject, dignity and autonomy were 
never in his possession to begin with. For example, while Mr. Stevens’ usage of the 
term “sir” is a cultural practice specific to his role, it invites us to see him as a 
subservient and powerless subject – vulnerable and submissive. 
On the second day of his trip in Salisbury, Mr. Stevens recalls a very 
important conference held at Darlington Hall, in which an American Senator – Henry 
Lewis – challenged the motivation behind the conference. Lewis described all of the 
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conference’s attendants as “naïve dreamers” and declared Darlington as a “classic 
English gentleman. Decent, honest, well-meaning,” but is ultimately “an amateur” 
(102). Henry Lewis’ proclamation challenges Mr. Stevens’ long-established belief, 
whether he is conscious of it or not, that Darlington and his alliances are noble and 
altruistic, which by extension, also challenges the notion that serving these men 
honorably would emphatically render one as dignified and patriotic. At the very least, 
the moment is significant enough for him to retain and reflect upon it in a waning 
memory in a period when such beliefs were passé. The coincidence that he reflects 
upon this episode on a very short trip of only four days long during the historical 
period of the Suez Crisis intimates that changing historical and political circumstances 
prompts and facilitates a deconstruction of Mr. Stevens’ ostensibly coherent identity, 
which is an integration of seemingly disparate multiple subject positions. As the novel 
develops, it becomes increasingly apparent that everything Mr. Stevens has ever 
known gradually becomes strangely unfamiliar to him such that what he thought he 
knew, he actually did not know at all. Mr. Stevens, thus, effectively experiences 
uncanniness, or “a disturbance of the familiar” (Bennett and Royle 25). Everything he 
knows and understands is limited within the ideological context of a being subject, an 
English butler who flourished by reproducing the cultural norms and practices of a 
vast and expanding empire. But when the empire waned, so too did Mr. Stevens’ 
spirit and essence, which is not to say, however, that Mr. Stevens as a cultural 
embodiment of the imperial zeitgeist has entirely become obsolete. 
According to Anthony D. Smith, “nationalism derives its force from its 
historical embeddedness” (viii), and further, 
nations perform general human functions, providing social cohesion, order, warmth 
and the like; that is why particular nations, though no part of any ‘natural order’, 
seem to their members to be all-embracing and immemorial, and we in turn must 
admit the power and enduring quality of the fundamental cultural ties. (5) 
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Although the British empire may have declined, the nationalism it fabricated to retain 
the loyalty and dedication of all of its subjects remains pertinent because, as Anthony 
D. Smith contends, of its historical embeddedness and capacity to provide for human 
social needs. As demonstrated by Mr. Stevens’ unease in the waning of the British 
empire, nationalism is a double-edged sword that is an ideology interpellated to ease 
the process of colonization and domination, but also provides mental stability for its 
citizens and subjects through creating fundamental cultural ties that produce social 
cohesion. According to Robert Young, landscape has cultural signification in 
fabricating the idea of Englishness. There is a “deep, primary affection for the English 
countryside” that “involves an attachment to the landscape…together with a certain 
class mobility” (9) that substantiates a profound sense of Englishness associated with 
grandeur and superiority, as if the landscape’s evocation of Englishness is a certain 
kind of class mobility, albeit only an illusion of it. 
This prompts the question of how landscape and geography contribute to 
identity construction. Mr. Stevens claims he came across “the English landscape at its 
finest” on his first day in Salisbury; and further, it “possesses a quality that the 
landscapes of other nations, however superficially dramatic, inevitably fail to 
possess” (28). According to Mr. Stevens, then, the English landscape possesses 
qualities unique only to England, such that the image of the English country is 
quintessentially English in nature. Homi Bhabha elaborates on the relationship 
between landscape and identity vis-à-vis national discourse, and explains that “the 
recurrent metaphor of landscape as the inscape of national identity emphasizes…the 
power of the eye to naturalize the rhetoric of national affiliation and its forms of 
collective expression” (NN 295). Although Britain’s international influence was 
weakening and the domestic social and political atmospheres were also changing – 
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both of which, as has been argued, provides critical historical contexts that challenge 
and deconstruct Mr. Stevens’ identity – he remarks that the “marvelous view” he 
encountered is “most deeply satisfying…and this quality is probably best summed up 
by the term ‘greatness’” and further, believes that “the landscape of [Britain] alone 
would justify” the name “Great Britain” (Ishiguro 28). For Mr. Stevens, landscape 
has an inherent relationship with the nation, which Bhabha argues, naturalizes the 
concept of a nation by discerning its manifestation in a visibly material form. By 
being able to visualize the “greatness” of the country in its landscape, “[n]ational time 
becomes concrete and visible” (NN 295), which only exalts Great Britain and 
intensifies nationalism for Mr. Stevens. By viewing such an astonishing and 
breathtaking landscape, Mr. Stevens is led to believe that Great Britain is, in fact, a 
real, concrete and material existence of which he can take pride in being a subject of. 
While British imperialism appears to be the topic, the novel is yet, of course, 
preoccupied with Englishness at a time when there is a slippage between ‘England’ 
and ‘Great Britain’; while the British empire may have declined, ‘England’ 
hauntingly persists and ‘Englishness’ is continuously interpellated and performed. 
Although many of the abstract components of British nationalism has been jettisoned 
or adapted to changing circumstances such as the waning of the British empire and 
the increasingly multiculturalism found in its metropolitan center, the English country 
unyieldingly endures as a cultural signification of the grandiose zeitgeist of British 
imperialism, which encourages Mr. Stevens to persist with that zeitgeist in mind and 
in practice.  
Nevertheless, as Ernest Gellner writes, “[t]he cultural shreds and patches used 
by nationalism are often arbitrary historical inventions” (59), revealing the notion of a 
“nation” and its cultural shreds (which include issues of class and social position) as 
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mere fabrications. Because they are fabrications, practices that stabilize them must 
constantly be repeated and performed, and landscape happens to be “[s]uch a space of 
cultural signification” (NN  299) that inspires Mr. Stevens to continue performing 
certain cultural practices and norms that are passé. One must also note that the entire 
novel parochially takes place in the English countryside, distant from multi-cultural 
and diverse London, which at the time was experiencing mass waves of immigration 
after Windrush.2 By circumscribing the novel within the countryside and largely 
ignoring direct references to London and its ongoing affairs, Ishiguro is demonstrably 
limiting the context in which Mr. Stevens functions within and presumably for good 
reason. Aijaz Ahmad contends, “‘culture’ generally and the literary/aesthetic realm in 
particular are situated at great remove from the economy and are therefore, among all 
the superstructures, the most easily available for idealization and theoretical slippage” 
(8) Mr. Stevens as an embodiment of cultural nationalism is removed from economic 
and political realities of the 1950s as per the Suez Crisis. What results is a 
“singularizing tendency” that “lends itself much too easily to parochialism, inverse 
racism and indigenist obscurantism” (8). We see this in Mr. Stevens’ unswerving 
veneration of the English butler as an esteemed professional in comparison to (those 
of) other nationalities, thereby rendering the English butler as an emblem of a unified 
and distinguished national culture. 
Conclusion 
 
Mr. Stevens is tragically deluded. He repudiates all personal relationships, 
including the tentative gestures of tenderness by Miss Kenton, and eschews all 
personal comforts and pleasures, opting to live in a small, damp, dark, and austere 
room because he finds fulfillment, or so he claims, in devotedly serving Lord 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Windrush marks the beginning of, what many people consider, a multi-cultural England. 
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Darlington. His behavior is at once conventional and eccentric because of a cruel 
misapprehension: he believes that Lord Darlington is a noble gentleman and 
Darlington Hall is a prestigious residence, both of which symbolize the greatness of 
England. He views the world “as a wheel” (Ishiguro 115) with England at the center.  
After Lord Darlington’s death and having performed what he believes to be a 
dignified English butler for the majority of his working years, Mr. Stevens’ 
encounters a paradigm shift (how complete his shift is is utterly ambiguous and 
perhaps even indeterminable) that perhaps parallels Britain’s status quo as a nation-
state. Tom Nairn writes, “‘[n]ationalism’ is the pathology of modern developmental 
history, as inescapable as ‘neurosis’ in the individual, with much the same essential 
ambiguity attaching to it” (359). Mr. Stevens needs the idea of ‘nationalism’ for 
subsistence just as Britain needs it to fuel its imperial causes; but at the decline of the 
empire, both Mr. Stevens and Britain are left “in the dilemmas of helplessness” (BB 
359), but not entirely because nationalism, as suggested earlier, has a historical 
embeddedness that allows it to endure in spite of changing political circumstances. Be 
that as it may, even as England has to accommodate itself to the rise of America as an 
super power, Mr. Stevens, after having served Lord Darlington for thirty-five years, 
has to adjust himself to an American master, which he finds difficult. His situation 
may, perhaps, best be described as uncanny. Freud writes, “the uncanny would 
always…be something one does not know one’s way about in” (931). Mr. Farraday, 
Mr. Stevens’ new employer, seems to foil everything Mr. Stevens has ever known; 
and yet, this American master bought Darlington Hall only because he wanted “a 
genuine grand old English house” and a “genuine old fashioned English butler” 
(Ishiguro 124). Because Mr. Stevens is ghostly figure of British imperialism, he fits 
the criteria of this “genuine old fashioned English butler” that Farraday desires; he “at 
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once belong[s] to and haunt[s] the idea of a place, and belong[s] to and haunt[s] the 
idea of a time” (Bennett and Royle 160). Mr. Stevens is also a figure of desire 
because he represents English heritage, but also an object of derision for some 
precisely because feudalism is intertwined with his heritage and what he represents. 
The brilliance of Ishiguro’s narrative strategy is such that, just as Darlington 
has convinced Mr. Stevens of the importance and nobility of his diplomatic 
maneuvering, the intimate tone of the narrative beguiles readers into a curious 
complicity with Mr. Stevens’ point of view, which enables one to empathize with Mr. 
Stevens even as the butler in him is completely taken in by Lord Darlington. Thus 
Ishiguro makes it possible for the reader to experience every nuance of the cruelly 
comic hoax which lies at the core of Mr. Stevens’ ideology and nationalism. Even the 
solid monumentality of Darlingotn Hall, the manifestation in brick and stone of 
England’s long and unbroken history of “greatness” is not real. Ishiguro’s narrative, 
however, is as performative as Mr. Stevens’ identity. Bennett and Royle write, 
“literary texts are part of a larger circulation of social energies, both products of and 
influences on a particular culture or ideology” (119). Remains of the Day is canonical 
in its portrayal of the end of the British Empire through a butler’s perspective, but at 
the same time, it is pedagogical as it influences what readers understand as British 
culture. Remains of the Day, through performing and revealing Mr. Stevens’ identity 
as a cultural construct, ultimately performs and reiterates those cultural shreds as 
“real” itself.  
Throughout Mr. Stevens’ countryside tour, his borrowed clothes, borrowed car 
and learned accent and manners cause various people to almost mistake him for his 
master. As always, like a good butler and a good Englishman, Mr. Stevens plays his 
role as an subordinate dutifully. Mr. Stevens walks on the tightrope of identity – he is 
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culturally displaced, and he neither belongs to the current British society nor can he 
ever hope to attain a comfortable membership amongst those he revers, who are now 
dead and buried. At the end of his tour, Mr. Stevens recognizes, as the result of his 
unsettling experiences on the road, a devastating truth: “I trusted in his lordship’s 
wisdom…I trusted I was doing something worthwhile. I can’t even say I made my 
own mistake. Really – one has to ask oneself – what dignity is there in that?” 
(Ishiguro 243). And this very man who expounded with absurdly tedious lengthiness 
on the importance of always maintaining one’s dignity, of never revealing one’s 
emotions in public, breaks down and weeps openly before a total stranger he meets at 
the pier in Weymouth. The breaking down of Mr. Stevens results from ideological 
bankruptcy, a ramification of realizing the hollow sham of his servitude. Interestingly, 
it is only when he becomes ideologically bankrupt that he has the capacity to access 
his wealth of emotions. Nevertheless, Mr. Stevens’ remaining days seem bleak, 
hollow, and empty; culturally displaced and without his master and the only culture 
he has ever known, he is disoriented and isolated. Mr. Stevens’ struggles are “not 
[merely] against nations and states as such but for different articulations of class, 
nation and state” (Ahmad 11). Remains of the Day is a novel about the end of the 
British Empire as much as it is about the remains of Mr. Stevens’ days after the 
decline of the empire. The ghostly character of Mr. Stevens reminds us that literature 
is historical, and that the past informs and lingers in the present. As Bennett and 
Royle write, “a great work will always seem uncanny, at once strange and familiar; a 
surprising, unique addition to the canon and yet somehow foreseen, programmed by 
the canon; at once readable and defiant, elusive, [and] baffling” (164). Although 
Remains of the Day is historically set in the beginning half of the twentieth century, 
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the examined issues of class, nation and state are still relevant today despite the 
alleged postnational context of globalization and shifting hegemonies. 
II 
The Reflexive Resurgence of Local and National Formations in Hari Kunzru’s 
Transmission
3 
Introduction: Global Matrix 
In an interview with Brian Hurley, Hari Kunzru explains that in writing 
Transmission (2005), he “wanted to do a book where nobody really meets each other” 
(May 2009), but everyone is globally connected by the transmission of people and 
information that is an effect of technology. The result is a novel that concerns itself 
with immigration and the ravenous power of new technology in a 21st-century global 
economy where the local and particular allegedly no longer have any meaning or 
power. “For Kunzru,” Ashley Shelden writes, “cosmopolitanism4 might well promise 
to produce a global ethics that allows for the admission of difference without 
demanding the assimilation of these differences to universal sameness” (CL 348). 
Despite all the highly mobile central characters – who reject the idea of place – being 
in different places, the eventual dispersal of a computer virus entertains the notion 
that the blurring of their destinies is only a mouse-click away, but as Shelden suggests, 
this does not necessary mean that there is universal homogenization. Nevertheless, 
many critics have characterized this phenomenon as the ultimate postmodern 
condition, as the cultural logic of “late-capitalism”, “post-Fordism” or neoliberalism. 
In The End of History and the Last Man, the political scientist and economist Francis 
Fukuyama declares liberal democracy, which I suspect masks neoliberalism beneath 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 In the last chapter, we witnessed the break-down of the “homogeneous nation” at the decline of the 
British empire, whose culture and narrative of national identity is becoming increasingly hybridized 
and ambivalent. This chapter will consider postnationalism in view of the globally produced local 
expressions of individuals experiencing mobile, hybrid and diasporic identities. 
4 For Shelden, the word cosmopolitanism involves a way of organizing the world and/or type of subject 
position that pertains to the ethical relation of the other, and love is a “fundamental category of ethics” 
(349).  
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the veil,5 as a Hegelian universal end of history.6 Alluding to, but pace Rousseau, 
Fukuyama contends, 
Technology makes possible the limitless accumulation of wealth, and thus the satisfaction of 
an ever-expanding set of human desires. This process guarantees an increasing 
homogenization of all human societies, regardless of their historical origins or cultural 
inheritances. All countries undergoing economic modernization must increasingly resemble 
one another: they must unify nationally on the basis of a centralized state, urbanize, replace 
traditional forms of social organization[.] (xiv-xv) 
Fukuyama’s claim assumes that modernity necessarily equates evolution and progress, 
and that in the process of moving towards modernity, the local and historical are 
replaced with a unitary global vision. Further, the claim that liberal democracy is “the 
only coherent political aspiration,” marked by liberal economic principles such as 
“free market” have “spread, and have succeeded in producing unprecedented levels of 
material!prosperity” (17) renders the Western experience of industrialization as the 
model for all societies hoping for economic growth and technological progress to 
follow. As Anna Greenspan writes, “[d]evelopment was a game of catch up. No 
matter where, it could only occur by imitating this Western model” (18). Following 
the Western linear pattern of historical progress, then, renders local and national 
cultural formations as superannuated, and subjects all countries in the world to a 
western notion of progress and enlightenment. It is difficult, then, to avoid seeing 
Fukuyama’s claim as both ethnocentric and ironically but unsurprisingly, totalitarian. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Wendy Brown catechizes, “the question is how much legitimacy neo-liberal governance requires 
from a democratic vocabulary, that is, how much does neo-liberalism have to cloak itself in liberal 
democratic discourse and work with liberal democratic institutions.” There is a “transformation of 
American liberal democracy into a political and social form…organized by a combination of neo-
liberal governmentality and imperial world politics, contoured in the short run by conditions of global 
economic and global security crises.” See Wendy Brown’s discussion of neoliberalism’s legitimation 
project and liberal democracy’s hypocrisy and ideological trickery in “Neoliberalism and the End of 
Liberal Democracy.” Theory and Event. 7:1, 2003.  
6 Fukuyama explains that he draws this understanding of History from Hegel. For Hegel, the end of 
history is Enlightenment, which means that human societies definitively reached a liberal state, but 
Fukuyama points out that, “[t]his did not mean that the natural cycle of birth, life, and death would end, 
that important events would no longer happen…It meant, rather, that there would be no further 
progress in the development of underlying principles and institutions, because all of the really big 
questions had been settled” (xii), and liberal democracy accomplishes this by replacing the irrational 
desire in Hegel’s master-slave dialectic to be recognized as greater than others “with a rational desire to 
be recognized as equal” (xx).!!
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The columnist Thomas Friedman calls this the “Golden Straitjacket”7 – a 
situation where a national economy can prosper only by playing according to the rules 
of the global market system, a system which will theoretically lead to, as Fukuyama 
suggests, global cultural homogenization. These increasing ties across national 
boundaries have drastically limited the policy options of modern states in a variety of 
spheres, and nation-states are now strictly limited to a neoliberal model of limited 
government intervention. As Arjun Appadurai declares in Modernity at Large, “the 
nation-state has become obsolete” (169). It is, thus, commonly believed that 
globalization has “deterritorialized” nations and created a world populated by 
cosmopolitans.8 But neither the increasing amount of cosmopolitans nor globalization 
itself necessarily suggests that the end of nationalism is nigh. Far from obsolescence, 
nationalism does not appear to be waning. In fact, the current era seems marked by a 
resurgence of nationalism as a major force in global affairs. The nation persists as an 
important source of identity, community and collective memory for most of the 
world’s population.  
 To return to the idea of transmission in a world system, everyone and 
everything is on the move and always transmitting across borders from one 
(cyber)space to another in Transmission. The novel, despite its kaleidoscopic 
portrayal of madcap adventures around the globe, centers around two main characters: 
Arjun Mehta, an Indian computer geek-cum-IT specialist in Silicon Valley, and Guy 
Swift, a design-obsessed white British national who earns his living selling brand 
concepts. These characters are, according to Telegraph journalist Helen Brown, 
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7 See Thomas Friedman, The Lexis and the Olive Tree. New York: Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 1999: ch. 
6. 
8 “It is not the mark of provincialism,” Fukuyama argues, “but of cosmopolitanism to recognize that 
there has emerged in the last few centuries something like a true global culture” (126). The 
provincialism Fukuyama refers to in contrast to the increasing sense of cosmopolitanism is indeed what 
Mr. Stevens in Remains of the Days struggles with. However, in the previous chapter, I argued that in 
spite of its mythical construction, national identity remains pertinent.!
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“more easily recognisable from life than from fiction. But they arrive on the page 
fresh from the school of believable modern stereotypes,” because they are both active 
participants in transnational networks who contribute to the idea that the globe’s 
inhabitants are becoming increasingly cosmopolitan (May 2004). Kunzru tells Granta, 
“[w]e live in a networked age so we need a networked art form that can reflect that” 
(August 2011). “I think the novel, in all its complexity” he explains, “can editorialize 
and clarify the ways that networks are reshaping our lives.” Many, including Kunzru, 
believe that within the network- and neoliberal policy-driven world system we live in 
today, the United States is a neocolonial power deeply involved with economic and 
cultural imperialism. Kunzru tells Helen Brown, “America is squatting in the middle 
of the world like this enormous, chest-thumping baboon” (May 2004). “Even if you 
avert your eyes from it,” he says, “you are deliberately [emphasis mine] averting your 
eyes from it.” This would, unquestionably, situate the United States at the core and 
developing societies in the periphery at a time when it is hotly contested whether this 
structural model remains relevant to or applicable in understanding the world system. 
“The crucial point,” according to Appadurai, “however, is that the United States is no 
longer the puppeteer of a world system of images but is only one node of a complex 
transnational construction of imaginary landscapes” (31). He further contends, 
“[g]lobalization does not necessarily or even frequently imply homogenization or 
Americanization” (17). In agreement with Appadurai, I think it is too simplistic a 
notion to equate globalization with Americanization. Further, that by conforming to 
neoliberal economic policies, a nation-state does not necessarily subsume itself under 
American hegemony; rather, it is a strategy to situate itself on the global stage as a 
global actor in a world economy that is increasingly valorizing the international 
division of labor. !
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Appadurai observes, “to the extent that different societies appropriate the 
materials of modernity differently, there is still ample room for the deep study of 
specific geographies, histories, and languages” (17). While it may seem antediluvian 
to study these geographies and histories in a global age, Transmission is very much a 
novel that examines these abstractions through the cultural clashes its characters 
encounter in their transnational trajectories. This may inform why and how 
“globalization is itself a deeply historical, uneven, and even localizing process” 
(Appadurai 17). As a point of departure in analyzing the localizing processes via the 
renascence of nations and nationalism as a resistance of a neoliberal postmodernity 
that posits the United States (or Western countries in general) at a core,9 I return to 
Kunzru’s Arjun Mehta, a boy from a subaltern culture engaging with the dominant 
power of the age. 
Pursuing the American dream in a global and decentered 21
st
 century 
Arjun Mehta is a dorky, shy, and naïve computer guy who sees his life in 
terms of Bollywood movies. Having grown up in the traditional core of New Delhi as 
part of the stultifying middle-class India, Arjun decides to leave his booming country 
of high-tech outsourcing for the diminishing prospects in Silicon Valley to battle for 
fame and fortune, and so win the heart of his lady love, just as in many of the 
Bollywood plots he reveres. In the 21st century, this means having “bravery, 
decisiveness and [a] diversified investment portfolio” (35), which, to an IT specialist 
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9 In a discussion regarding postnationality, Richard Jenkins maintains that “[g]lobalization and 
heightened localization…are inter-linked: the world is becoming smaller and larger at the same time, 
cultural space is shrinking and expanding. Localism and ethnicity are…two sides of the same coin, and 
each may (re)assert itself as a defensive reaction to, or a result of, the increasing global context of 
social life” (RE 43). An elucidation by Wendy Brown may be necessary and insightful in 
understanding the context in which “post” is prefixed to nationality: “the prefix ‘post’ signifies a 
formation that is temporally after but not over that to which it is affixed” (WS 21). “‘Post’ indicates a 
very particular condition of afterness in which what is past is not left behind,” she continues, “but, on 
the contrary, relentlessly conditions, even dominates a present” (21).  
!
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in India, means going to America and working in computers. Thus, in endeavoring to 
pursue this glamorous life in dreamy California and moving towards embracing a 
globalized monoculture, Arjun becomes part of India’s brain drain problem that calls 
attention to questions of loyalty and nationalism. As a country that has long been cast 
to the peripheries of world power and struggled with its allocation of resources, 
diasporic talented and skilled professionals are seen as renegades. Mr. Khan, brother 
to one of his college professors who employs him, brings light to this matter,  
There is the loyalty matter,” he growled, wagging a bony finger in Arjun’s face, “of loyalty. 
And the matter of patriotism. Who has trained you to do this work? India! Who has provided 
the schools? What do you think it means for you to take yourself abroad, instead of using your 
talents for the good of the nation?” (22-3) 
In India and the IT Revolution, however, Anna Greenspan explains that “[t]he image 
of a high-tech whiz has become the icon of a new India, one that defies the 
stereotypes of snake charmers and starving children” (3). “Indeed,” she continues, 
“the Indian ‘techie’ has begun to take its place alongside blue jeans, fast food and 
MTV as one of the key symbols of contemporary capitalism” (3). “India,” Greenspan 
declares, “is in the midst of a revolution; one that many argue is no less profound than 
the revolution of 1947 in which India was granted its independence” (2). With the IT 
revolution in mind, Greenspan describes a changing India and prompts a very curious 
question: 
With a billion people, the world’s largest democracy, an enormous pool of English-speaking 
engineers, an expanding middle class and one of the greatest untapped markets on the planet, 
India’s encounter with cyberspace has a far-reaching impact on the future of globalization. 
Yet, how are we to understand this new India and its place within the information age? (3) 
If, contrary to Mr. Khan’s belief, Arjun is not contributing to India’s brain drain 
problem but rather to its amplifyng power and influence in the world, Arjun would 
not only be the novel’s hero, but also India’s. But is someone of Arjun’s caliber likely 
to succeed in this task and story of when east meets west? The odds seem slim. 
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 Standing outside a New Delhi office tower, “Connaught Place seethed with 
life…For a moment Arjun Mehta, consumed by hesitation, was the only stationary 
figure in the crowd” (6). Arjun’s dawdling ponderosity is contrasted with the fast-
paced and highly mobile world around him. Arjun also displays signs of having 
difficulty grasping the relativity of time, an issue pertinent to global discourse: 
Behind the front desk sat a receptionist. Above her a row of clocks, relics of the optimistic 
1960s, displayed the time in key world cities. New Delhi seemed to be only two hours ahead 
of New York, and one behind Tokyo. Automatically Arjun found himself calculating the 
shrinkage in the world implied by this error, but, lacking even a best estimate for certain of the 
variables, his thoughts trailed away. For a moment or two the image hung around ominously 
in his brain, the globe contracting like a deflating beach ball. (6) 
Arjun’s perturbation and fluster over the “shrinkage in the world,” realized in his 
temporal calculus of global cities, largely has to do with the temporal compression, as 
well as conflation, with space. Even as a computer whiz, Arjun’s innocence and 
naiveté renders him incapable of apprehending the reality of time-space compression. 
As he parts with his family, he “felt proud that in the eyes of his family he was finally 
doing something worthwhile,” but readers are simultaneously called to a Bollywood 
imaginary: “In a film the scene would be accompanied by music, and he would lead a 
crowd of long-haul passengers in a dance routine” (30). Arjun’s perception of reality 
is not only distorted and inseparable from the irrealities of his revered Bollywood 
films, but his awareness of global economic trends is also delayed. At a time when 
jobs are flying eastward, Arjun embarks on a trans-Pacific flight to the shrunken 
horizons of Silicon Valley. And he is completely unsuspecting and oblivious of this 
ironic gesture that is reality. Dreamy, geeky, and naïve, can Arjun Mehta’s story 
avoid becoming the tale of an innocent abroad, and reduce him simply to a boy from a 
subaltern culture who cannot compete against American hegemony? 
Transnational enterprises: a mere simulation of coolness and audacity? 
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 Enter Guy Swift, “thirty-three years old, UK citizen, paper millionaire and 
proud holder of platinum status on three different frequent-flyer programs” (11). 
“Guy Swift, twice Young British Market Visionary of the Year and hold of several 
Eurobrand achievement awards” appears to be everything Arjun is not (11). 
Everything about Guy Swift’s appearance shouts cosmopolitan and signals elite 
status; in short, he is someone who is unquestionably able to reap the benefits of 
globalization. As Arjun commutes to his interview for Databodies in New Delhi, Guy 
is flying first-class above: 
High in the sky overhead was the vapor trail of a jet, a commercial flight crossing Indian 
airspace en route to Singapore. In its first-class compartment sat another traveler, rather more 
comfortably than Arjun, who was squashed against the damp shoulder of a man in a polyester 
shirt. Did Guy Swift sense some occult connection with the boy on the bus thirty thousand 
feet below? Did he perhaps feel a tug, a premonition, the kind of unexplained phenomenon 
that has its correlative a shiver or a raising of the hairs on the neck or arms? No. Nothing. He 
was playing Tetris on the armrest games console. (11) 
In spite of his global competence, everything about Guy is studiedly ironic, from the 
ring tone he chooses for his cell phone to his quest for finding the “perfect” gift for 
Gabriella, with whom he is in a floundering relationship. Perhaps the most ironic bit 
about this successful globe-trotting entrepreneur is his inability to comprehend the 
local and meet its needs. Tomorrow* is the clever name he has come up with for his 
consulting business, which “[i]n three short years, Guy had grown Tomorrow* into an 
agency with an international profile” (19). Guy Swift: The Mission states “the future is 
happening today, and in today’s fast-moving future the worst place to do business is 
the past. I strive to add value by surfing the wave of innovation” (19). While 
Tomorrow* has been an up and coming company, Guy is experiencing a shortage of 
clients that requires him to seek funding from the transnational Transcendenta. 
Working with Transcendenta, however, requires Guy to tread into unfamiliar 
territories, which will inevitably illuminate his weaknesses:  
There had been a reception in Barcelona, with canapés in the shapes of dot-com logos and 
waiters dressed as Antonio Gaudi. He had stood at a poolside bar and they had asked him to 
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imagine a truly [emphasis mine] globalized branding agency, concentrating on the local needs 
of transnational clients. If Tomorrow* placed itself at this node, it would potentiate the 
synergetic emergence of something, thus maximizing feedback in something else and placing 
everyone at the apex of a place they all wanted to be. They stood, they told him, on the crest 
of the latest Kondratiev wave. Transcendenta, nine months old, was already valued!in the 
hundreds of millions…So instead of being wedged in a West End toilet cubicle with a couple 
of nightclub PRs, he now found himself on the other side of the world, being driven around in 
an unstable electrical vehicle by a rich kid with a death wish. About to play golf. (168) 
There is surely a lot of capitalist rhetoric going on in this scene that undoubtedly 
functions as a reminder that the globe we inhabit is becoming smaller and more 
integrated; and as such, the world is becoming more unified and interconnected. But 
what are Guy’s bearings in all of this? When Guy fails to sell his brand concept with 
the owner of a golf resort chain, Guy’s inability to meet the local needs of 
transnational clients is highlighted. While everything about Guy may epitomize 
“going global,” he ironically falters when it comes to dealing with the local. 
Golf is apparently a “blind spot in his recreational prowess [that] had never 
previously been an issue, and probably would not matter now were Mr. Al-Rahman 
not the owner of a leisure group that specialized in golf resorts, which in fact owned 
twenty-four scattered across the world from Osaka to British Columbia” (169). 
Unable to score affection with pitiful and non-existent golfing skills and the inability 
to give a PowerPoint presentation with cool visual effects on the green, Guy struggles 
to convey his proposal, densely filled with high-tech but meaningless locutions, 
effectively to Al-Rahman. Anthony D. Smith contends that “[t]hroughout the world 
humanity is bound to the wheel of automated technologies and encircled by a forest of 
mass communications” (NN 1). For Jean Baudrillard, this is “a question of 
substituting the signs of the real for the real, that is to say of an operation of deterring 
every real process via its operational double, a programmatic, metastable, perfectly 
descriptive machine that offers all the signs of the real and short-circuits all its 
vicissitudes” (SS 2). It is clear at this point that Guy has no substantial knowledge of 
golf – the sport he is venturing to exclusively brand for Mr. Al-Rahman – and instead 
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utilizes the impressive visuals of technology as an attempt to mask what he in fact 
knows very little about. Through Guy’s utilization of technology to market the sport, 
Guy is effectively replacing the real thing with images, or signs, of what golf might be. 
Even without his computer, Guy markets the methodology of the simulation well as 
he attempts to explain to Mr. Al-Rahman, “[t]he method Tomorrow* uses, which is a 
proprietary process, is called TBM. This stands for Total Brand Mutability, and like I 
say, it’s our thing….[we] help our clients achieve their full Brand Evolution 
Potential” (170). Guy’s agglomeration of empty signs, effectively, would imply that 
the golf resorts are feigning to have something they do not. From the perspective of 
Mr. Al-Rahman, this simulation of empty signs Guy proposes as part of the leisure 
chain’s “Brand Evolution Potential” does not provide the company with due respect 
and dignity for its real services and worth. Al-Rahman tells Guy, “It is a question of 
respect, Mr. Swift. I like to do business with men who respect the things I do. You, I 
suppose, respect other things, such as your circles and maps” (172). Guy does not 
understand Al-Rahman’s words, because Guy thinks his only trajectory is towards 
success seeing how he considers himself “better adapted to the environment of the 
global city,” as someone who “made opportunities” for himself and “knew how to 
network, how to manipulate the flows of money and information to produce results” 
(206-7). But the results he promises are based on marketing empty signs that attenuate 
Mr. Al-Rahman’s company and services; rather than marketing in such a way that 
represents, Guy seeks to simulate, and create the very products, services, institutions, 
or ideas of his clients. Baudrillard distinguishes between representation and 
simulation, 
Representation stems from the principle of the equivalence of the sign and of the real (even if 
this equivalence is utopian, it is a fundamental axiom). Simulation, on the contrary, stems 
from the utopia of the principle of equivalence, from the radical negation of the sign as value, 
from the sign as the reversion and death sentence of every reference. Whereas representation 
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attempts to absorb simulation by interpreting it as a false representation, simulation envelops 
the whole edifice of representation itself as a simulacrum. (SS 6) 
In representation, the sign is an equivalent image of the real thing; a simulation, 
however, entirely replaces the real. Unsurprisingly then, Mr. Al-Rahman – a character 
who very much appreciates and values the real – finds Guy’s marketing strategy 
offensive.  
The EU: a simulation of supranationalism and a united continent 
While Al-Rahman finds Guy’s attempt to simulate what he does offensive, the 
Pan-European Border Authority (PEBA), “an artifact of EU integration intended to 
harmonize the immigration and customs regimes of all the member states” (154) finds 
Guy’s talent to create simulations very functional and appropriate for their interests. 
The construction of the European Union is a bold effort at the peaceful integration of 
a multitude of nation-states into a transnational reality fit for globalization, which is 
still under construction, or perhaps, as Gerard Delanty might say, “under invention” 
(54). Guy, then, is the appropriate guy to help construct this transnational reality. But 
the question is, if the EU seeks the peaceful integration of a multitude of nation-states, 
why is border control such an issue? Bocca, a key figure in PEBA, states, “[a] 
common European border authority must have common information collection and 
retrieval…Otherwise you find some terrorist or economic migrant in one country and 
lose him again when he crosses into another” (Kunzru 234). More importantly, Bocca 
explains that “[t]he problem with these people is they lie, they destroy their papers. 
You have no way of knowing who they are. They say they’re from a war zone but 
actually all they want is to take a job from a citizen” (235). Bocca explains all of this 
to justify the need to go high-tech in border security, but at the heart of the problem is 
that economic interests are conflated with social and political concerns. Sam Pryke 
explains, “[t]he demarcated national patches of the world might be porous to ever 
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greater migration flows, but this hardly means that governments are relaxed about the 
matter” (NGW 2). Further, Pryke notes that “[w]hatever liberalization there has been 
of national economies over recent decades, it is hardly as if economic protectionism is 
a thing of the past” (2). Far from a utopian vision of extending democracy and 
granting global citizenship, the EU via PEBA seeks to deny both democracy and 
citizenship for people who are deemed less desirable.10 
! Interestingly, Europe, while concerned with keeping less desired migrants out 
and concurrently using these borders to assert its economic superiority across the 
continent, is simultaneously engaged with competing against American hegemony.11 
Guy tells the people who run PEBA, “[w]hat my team has come to realize is that in 
the twenty-first century, the border is not just a line on the earth anymore,” giving 
readers a faint impression that he has some awareness that structural boundaries no 
longer provide a functional understanding of geopolitics, only to follow up with 
declaring,  
It’s so much more than that. It’s about status. It’s about opportunity. Sure, you’re either inside 
or outside, but you can be on the inside and still be outside right? Or on the outside looking in. 
Anyway, like we say in one of our slides, ‘the border is everywhere. The border,’ and this is 
key, ‘is in your mind.’ Obviously from a marketing point of view a mental border is a plus, 
because a mental border is a value and a value is something we can promote. (Kunzru 235)  
So Guy returns to a structural understanding of the world, only to worsen things by 
bringing stature into the discussion. Guy states, “Citizenship is about being one of the 
gang, or as we like to say at Tomorrow*, ‘in with the crowd’” (235). In doing so, he is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 This unfortunately often refers to people from non-democratic and less economically developed 
societies. Judith Butler blogs, “neo-liberalism works through producing dispensable populations…it 
decimates long-standing institutions of social democracy, withdraws social services from those who are 
most radically unprotected – the poor, the homeless, the undocumented – because the value of social 
services or economic rights to basic provisions like shelter and food has been replaced by an economic 
calculus that values only the entrepreneurial capacities of individuals and moralizes against all those 
who are unable to fend for themselves or make capitalism work for them” (Greek Left Review, 
November 12, 2011). For Butler, neo-liberalism is the constraint of globalization that prevents radical 
democracy from taking place. In this light, neo-liberalism as what Fukuyama sees as the end of history 
is not only totalitarian, but also in the case of the EU, reflexively suggests who you are and where you 
come from still matter.  
11 The previous chapter discusses the shift of power from Europe to the United States in mid-20th 
century.  
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creating the image of Europe as an elite place, “somewhere you want to go, but 
somewhere that’s not for everyone. A continent that wants people, but only the best. 
An exclusive continent. An upscale continent” (235). Where Europe cannot compete 
economically, it defaults to the cultural. In spite of Director Becker’s denials of her 
interests in how culture can function as a key role in reasserting Europe’s influence 
and power, her words have betrayed her mind: “I don’t think classical music and 
television dramas about the Romans are enough. The promotion of heritage is one 
thing. We have won this argument” (238). This suggests that Europe has failed to 
produce a cultural space that matches with the temporal movement of American 
neoliberalism, if she feels, “[i]t is the youth we must persuade. Hip-hop gangster 
rappers must drive European cars. They must fire European guns!” (238). Needless to 
say, Becker is hardly concerned with promoting domestic security on the global front, 
for she is only concerned with protecting European borders as to rebuild a Europe that 
can reassert itself on the global stage and compete with the US.  
 Introducing some keycard blanks that “had EU blue and gold on one side and 
the words ‘platinum member’ embossed on the other,” Guy announces “welcome to 
Club Europa – the world’s VIP room” (239). While he lives and works as if he is a 
global citizen, the concept he seeks to promote in the PEBA project is one that would 
effectively deny people citizenship and cross-border entries on the basis of class. 
Etienne Balibar has blogged about and shared his sentiments regarding this situation 
and the questionable European construction: 
In its current form, under the influence of the dominant social forces, the European 
construction may have produced some degree of institutional harmonization, and generalized 
some fundamental rights, which is not negligible, but, contrary to the stated goals, it has not 
produced a convergent evolution of national economies, a zone of shared prosperity, far from. 
Some countries are dominant, others are dominated, with respect to shares in the markets, or 
concentration of financial capital, or industrial dependency. The peoples may not have 
antagonistic interests, but the nations increasingly do. (Greek Left Review, July 2010)  
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The EU’s project led by Guy Swift’s Tomorrow* is based on a very thin and abstract 
condition of unity that aims to persuade us that a European audience might come to 
enjoy the imagined community and solidarity of some kind of supra-national 
identification, provided that they are “in with the crowd.” In Cosmopolitics, Bruce 
Robbins asserts, 
Instead of assuming that capitalism’s insatiable drive to occupy every corner of the globe has 
led to the imminent collapse of the nation-state, we should consider how tied to particular 
places capitalism remains and how strong (if unequal) an interest it has in propping up the 
nation-state…Under many circumstances capitalism needs the stabilizing powers of the 
nation-state and will work to build the state up, not tear it down. (8) 
Robbins’ explication very clearly reflects the EU situation.12 If the European 
construction is a small-scale model for the prospects of a truly transnational world in 
which national antagonisms no longer matter because economic and political 
developments are even, then the outlook is very dim. “Why”, asks Tom Nairn, “has 
the End of History carried us forward into a more nationalist world?” (LRB 6).  
Jonathan Friedman provides one possible answer:  
the weakening of former national identities and the emergence of new identities, especially the 
dissolution of a kind of membership known as ‘citizenship’ in the abstract meaning of 
membership in territorially defined, state-governed society, and its replacement by an identity 
based on ‘primordial loyalty’, ethnicity, ‘race’, local community, language and other 
culturally concrete forms. (61-2) 
These culturally concrete forms, in the end and reflexively so, reconstruct the national 
affiliations and identities that have been weakened by global processes. And as 
reflected by Robbins, the onrush of neoliberalism through which globalization thrives 
necessitates the existence of nation-states to reinforce and practice the economic 
principles, which invariably lead to a constant state of competiting for power. Take 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Wendy Brown writes in Theory and Event, “the politically exploitable hollowness in formal 
promises of freedom and equality” as promised by the EU, “has largely vanished to the extent that both 
freedom and equality have been redefined by neo-liberalism.” The EU’s interests, exemplified through 
the establishment of PEBA and its interests, are more concerned with neoliberalism than democracy. 
Under such a condition, as explained by Balibar, some countries are dominant, while others are 
dominated.  
!
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Tony Blair for example. When he returned to London from the Nice Conference of 
the European Union at the end of 2000, he reported to Parliament:  
It is possible, in our judgement, to fight Britain’s corner, get the best out of Europe for Britain 
and exercise real authority and influence in Europe. That is as it should be. Britain is a world 
power. To stand aside from the key alliance – the EU – right on our doorstep, is not advancing 
Britain’s interests; it is betraying British interests. (Hansard, 11 December 2000, Col. 351.) 
In Global Matrix, Tom Nairn explains, “Greatness is all. For a world-power, 
making use of Europe is a necessity, but remains one tool among others,” as Tony 
Blair conveys (164). Nairn elaborates, “[t]here is no question of joining in the sense 
of merging, or identifying the national interest with such a wider project” (164). 
When Guy finds himself caught in the middle of an immigration raid after having 
been brought to an unknown location by an Eastern European prostitute, he finds it 
necessary to jettison his “global” citizenship for his national one. He tells the 
policemen, “English. I’m fucking English” (Kunzru 260) as if his nationality is 
superior and thus can somehow place him outside of this border controlling mess. At 
the very moment Guy Swift instinctively finds this need to perpetually assert and 
reiterate his British nationality, his cosmopolitanism recedes into the background 
whilst the question of nationality moves to the fore. What makes his genealogy urgent 
is his particular need to use this historical connection – to the decentered center – to 
have a specific political effect – that is, to get out of his arrest, detainment, and 
imminent deportation to a country he has no connections to and with whatsoever. 
Ironic as it is, Guy Swift – a figure from what was once considered the center – 
becomes unvoiced in this situation and attempts to utilize his genealogy to find a 
voice; yet, it is a voice not taken seriously by his detainers. For Foucault, genealogy 
resists the totality of continuous history; while the UK once exerted great power and 
influence over vast corners across the globe, it is now experiencing a discontinuity in 
its history, which assumed linear progression and an indefinite teleology. When useful 
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though, he redeploys a continental and transnational identity: “He spoke loudly and 
clearly,” to attract the attention of the guards, “I am EU cit-i-zen. I need ta-xi to my 
hotel” (261). Guy, in yet another ironic moment in his irony-filled life, becomes a 
victim of the borders he seeks to construct and protect against the subaltern groups, 
which he is mistakenly identified with in the immigration raid. 
Postmodernity 
 
The world as a seamless web 
 
Under normal circumstances, Guy may have been more likely able to get out 
of this debacle. “How Guy Swift, young marketeer, British national and vocal speaker 
of English came to be identified as Gjergj Ruli, Albanian national, suspected pyramid 
fraudster and failed asylum seeker in Germany,” the novel tells us, “was one of the 
more bizarre stories to result from the infection of the Schengen Information System 
by what is now known as Variant Eight Leela, the so-called transpositional worm” 
(263). Leela08 is created by none other than Arjun Mehta, and the transmission of it 
across all corners of the globe demonstrates the interconnected vulnerability of human 
beings in the highly detailed chaos of our postmodern world. With rapid technological 
innovation there has been an increase in the volume, speed, and reach of individual 
and collective spatial mobility and a dramatic expansion of the power, speed, and 
volume of information transfers. Is culture included in these information transfers, 
and if so, are they able to transmit as hypersonically? In virtual reality, Leela08 is 
evidence that the answer is emphatically, yes; however, in the case of spatial reality, 
the process proves much more challenging and complicated. 
As an Indian in America, Arjun is not only a traveller in space, but he is also a 
traveller in time, transmitted from an ancient culture to one that barely remembers 
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yesterday from its impatience in rushing to the future.13 Arjun’s initial reaction to 
America is astonishment at the gargantuan scale of the cars, the malls, the freeways, 
and of course the palpable sense of money and power and possibility. After a year of 
this, however, he cannot sleep properly, has eczema, lies to his family about his 
success in America, has little or no illusion left after a year of largely being 
unemployed, and can be found walking on foot in suburban California, which makes 
him at least one of four things: “poor, foreign, mentality ill or jogging” (36). One 
whole year in America, and Arjun is nowhere closer to actualizing his dreams than 
when he was in India, “[l]iving his dreams was proving hard” (38); but to worsen the 
situation, he is both poor and foreign. Databodies, a fly-by-night company that makes 
its income by commissioning the wages of people who they find jobs for, finally finds 
a long-term position at Virugenix, in Redmond, Washington, as an assistant virus-
tester for Arjun.!!
Just when he thought his life was starting to pick up, he gets laid off. Jennifer 
Johanssen, deputy director of personnel at Virugenix tells him, “In your time here, 
you have added quality and value” and fades into a discussion about compassion and 
the reversals of fortune, and finally “reality,” as if Arjun had been living in an irreality 
all this time (90). But Arjun remained in denial: “Then it struck him. This was not his 
story. This was not his story because this was not how his story went. There had been 
a mistake” (90). It was not his story because it did not match up to the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 This argument may be difficult to accept because the myriad techno-science parks and cyber towers 
in Asia are unmatched anywhere else in the West, and have shown how developing societies can speed 
through modernity through discontinuous jumps. Anna Greenspan explains, “India, like most 
‘developing’ societies, has a kind of anachronistic culture in which the deep past mingles easily with 
the far future. Time here is often scrambled, and change rarely occurs through gradual steps or stages. 
Rather, one moves – in an instant – from the tea shack on one side of the road to ‘Cybertowers’ on the 
other. Here, on the periphery, the future does not emerge through a slow and steady process of 
development but arrives instantaneously through discontinuous jumps” (40). But one must bare in mind 
that infrastructural problems within the public space are often bypassed in these discontinuous jumps 
made to catch up to American development. 
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Bollywoodesque dreams he had envisioned for himself in America. According to 
Faiza Hirji, Bollywood is hybridized and “consciously mimics some American norms 
and contains other aspects of Western culture, yet it also repudiates the same, 
suggesting the superiority of Indian culture” (DC 19). What is more important to note, 
is that Bollywood also suggests “India as the only really desirable location for the 
authentic South Asian” (19). She continues, “[i]n its avowal of nationalism and 
cultural tradition, it presents a significant challenge to American domination of 
international film and culture” (19). Bollywood, thus, becomes a crucial assertion of 
nationalism and cultural tradition that “writes back” to and escapes from 
Americanization. Tom Nairn contends, “[w]ith all its shortcomings and contradictions, 
globalization had been showing signs of escaping from US neo-liberal hegemony over 
the past few years” (NN 30). Bollywood rhetoric effectively uses cinema, a 
mechanical art borrowed from American industrialization (in other words capitalism), 
to assert and demonstrate that while neoliberal economic principles may be 
efficacious in changing the world’s image and understanding of India, the country 
nonetheless preserves very strong cultural bearings independent of the hegemon. 
Borrowing and practicing America’s economic principles, then, is reduced to a means 
to an end, such that India is merely using “America’s way” to showcase its own long-
standing cultural heritage. In Iyotika Virdi’s words, “India, imagined in films over the 
decades through binary oppositions – the feudal vs. the modern, country vs. city, east 
vs. west, rural vs. urban – now pits the national against the transnational” (CIN 202-3). 
Interestingly though, Hirji claims, “Bollywood itself [emphasis mine] plays 
the role of attempted imperialist by primarily marketing Hindi-language films to an 
enormous community…by working to promote a kind of Hindu, Hindi-speaking, 
middle- to upper-class, pan-Indian identity that ignores the specificity of various 
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regions and cultures” (DC 19). Arjun’s affinity and affection towards Bollywood, as 
both a political and cultural artefact, then seem inseparable from an understanding of 
Arjun as an Indian national, in the most unifying sense, despite pursuing his dreams in 
America. Hirji explains, though, that in Bollywood films, “[t]he goal is not to ignore 
life outside South Asia but to overcome its lures; to return from overseas, a place of 
much temptation, and apply one’s knowledge to the betterment of India is a laudable 
goal” (108). “Globalization,” Hirji continues, “is a behemoth that cannot be put aside, 
yet in the end its alienating tendencies cannot overcome India’s traditions and deep 
sense of self” (108). Surely, Arjun thought he would one day return home to India 
after becoming a hero as well; and likewise, Arjun does find a very deep and 
profound sense of self in the Bollywood films he watches. Arjun, in performing and 
demonstrating his “Indianness” vis-à-vis his interests and the way he thinks, is both a 
subject and object of Indian nationalism and culture. This becomes much more 
profound and evident when Arjun releases and transmits the Leela08 virus. 
As a result of the dotcom bubble’s bust and burst, and “because of first in and 
first out and being foreign national and all” (Kunzru 227), Virugenix laid off Arjun. 
Arjun Mehta, in America, is what Ernest Gellner would define as entropy-resistant: 
“A classification is entropy-resistant if it is based on an attribute which has a marked 
tendency not to become,” even with the passage of time, “evenly dispersed 
throughout the entire society” (NN 63). So Arjun creates a brilliantly complex virus in 
order to prove his worth, “to cause a little disruption, just a small problem, because 
then I could step in and solve it and be the hero” (227). But his release of Variant 
Eight Leela, named after his most idolized Bollywood star, ends up as “a swarm, a 
horde” (107) that mutates itself to invade and infect every organ of the world body 
and wreaks havoc on global economies. We are told that “According to Julia Schaffer 
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of Symantec Corporation, who has written extensively on Mehta’s programming 
techniques, the viruses he unleashed represent ‘a revolution in code’” (267), and this 
revolution in code is as much a revolution in IT and India. Appadurai, in Fear of 
Small Numbers, explains, “[v]irulent nationalisms also thrive in the context of 
cyberspace, but they nevertheless complicate the solidity of ties between space, place 
and identity” (24). As Greenspan suggests, the IT revolution “has enabled India to 
shed its image – both at home and abroad – of being a victimized, third-world country 
that is unable to compete globally” (IT 79). In other words, the IT revolution has 
placed India on the global stage, and competitively so. Arjun’s decision to name the 
virus he disseminates across the globe after a Bollywood star only reinforces India’s 
competitiveness in the global economy. The overbearing metaphor in all of this, is of 
course that the repression of the subaltern, whether with malign intent or not, 
undermines the dominant culture. When India’s place in the IT revolution is 
juxtaposed with Bollywood, the effect of India’s emergence is much more penetrating 
in global discourse. Hirji explains that “[o]ccasional visits, e-mail messages, and 
telephone calls may not offer the same window onto the homeland as that offered by 
cinema, which can display visual images and explanations of the rites and customs 
that accompany life events” (DC 102). Hirji’s explanation, I would argue, extends 
beyond diasporic Indians and applies to anyone in the world who participates and uses 
the technological advancements of our day, and particularly to those who also watch 
Bollywood films. Both IT and Bollywood have unveiled an India that was 
unfathomable sixty years ago. Greenspan argues that “[i]n the globalized information 
economy, the marginal has the potential to overtake the mainstream” (IT 70). “IT,” 
Greenspan contends, “is not inextricably tied to the West. Once opened up, the 
networks of globalization are influenced as much – if not more – by the creative 
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mutations that seep in from the periphery” (38). But when globalization is influenced 
as much by the “periphery” as it is by the “core,” or even more radically, the 
“periphery” contributes to a hollowing-out of the “core,” a structural core-periphery 
model seems rather anachronistic in understanding global processes. 
The fallacies of quantifiable analysis of modernity 
India has largely concerned itself with discontinuous temporal jumps to assert 
itself in global economics, but at the cost of this is a negligence of the spatial, and 
included in this is the spatial politics of democracy. The idea that third-world 
countries will progress to the extent that they imitate the West is a misguided myth for 
individuals and groups that believe globalization equates cultural imperialism or 
economic neocolonialism, and a dangerous one for developing societies that believe 
economic competitiveness is enough to qualify a country on the global stage. In a 
recent Ted talk, political economist Yasheng Huang draws from statistical evidence 
from the Asian model and concludes that, “there’s really no support for the idea that 
authoritarian governments hold a systematic edge over democracies in terms of 
economic growth.”14 In the same talk, Huang compares India and China’s levels of 
economic development, and while China’s economy has grown much faster than 
India’s because China is a totalitarian state that can disregard (the will of) its citizens, 
Huang ultimately argues that for long-term sustainability, China needs political 
reforms towards a democracy. Huang’s argument is interesting, to say the very least; 
however, I suspect that India’s growth is not entirely stifled by its democracy, but 
rather by the state’s failure to distribute its democratic values evenly across the nation.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 The Asian model refers to the prosperity of the Four Tigers: Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and 
South Korea, which had authoritarian governments in the 60s, 70s, and/or 80s that allowed for the 
proliferation of economic development. However, North Korea, Burma, the Philippines, to name a few, 
did not succeed in spite of having authoritarian governments.  
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 As mentioned previously, the assumption is that economic development can 
contribute to infrastructural developments. This is the case in India, but the 
infrastructural developments are limited only to those who contribute to the economic 
development. Besides slicing through bureaucracy (how democratic!), IT companies 
are able to “bypass India’s crumbling public sphere” (Greenspan 81) by situating the 
companies in sequestered and insulated techno parks where resources lacking across 
the country are in abundance.15 There is a striking distinction between the companies 
(private) and public space. According to Greenspan, 
Walking down the street, one cannot fail to notice the discrepancy between people’s personal 
space, which tends to be extremely clean, with crisply ironed clothes, and spotlessly polished 
shoes, and the filthy, unpaved, garbage-littered public areas within which they are forced to 
walk…For IT companies, who require highly efficient transportation and communication 
grids in order for their businesses to function, it is imperative to escape these failures [power 
outages] of the State. The government, in an implicit recognition of its own ineptitude, helps 
facilitate this process…The STPIs, which are in the business of offering high speed 
communication links, also provide centers equipped with back-up power, telecom services, 
bandwidth and other technical infrastructure. (81-2)  
Companies function extraneously to the state because of the state’s ineptitudes, but 
these companies and their subsidiaries are also the sole proprietors of any 
infrastructural development owned by the state. The IT industry’s avoidance of the 
breakdowns of the public sphere suggests a discrepancy between the economic and 
the social, and congruently, the temporal and the spatial. 
 “Failure to defer gratifications is often used by conservative critics, for 
example, to explain the persistence of impoverishment in an affluent society,” David 
Harvey writes in The Condition of Postmodernity, “even though that society 
systematically promotes the debt-financing of present gratifications as one of its 
principal engines of economic growth” (202), and this is what we are witnessing in 
not only India, but all societies practicing neoliberalism today. Harvey points out a 
paradox in the desire for immediate gratification: 
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15 India does not have a shortage of resources; the widespread inaccessibility is rather due to the 
misallocation of resources. 
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We learn our ways of thinking and conceptualizing from active grappling with the 
spatializations of the written word, the study and production of maps, graphs, diagrams, 
photographs, models, paintings, mathematical symbols, and the like. How adequate are such 
modes of thought and such conceptions in the face of the flow of human experience and 
strong processes of social change? On the other side of the coin, how can spatializations in 
general, and aesthetic practices in particular, represent flux and change, particularly if these 
latter are held essential truths to be conveyed? (206) 
In other words, we have increasingly turned to quantifiable models to understand and 
measure social change, but how well can quantitative analysis represent the human 
experience of these changes? Surely, postcolonial nations such as India are evidently 
playing a game of catch-up in which development in a few limited areas – technology, 
for instance – reigns supreme, without due concern for proper allocation of these 
developments and resources. Thus, paradoxically, it seems that only through time, is 
time conquered; but again, in a nation-state’s trajectory towards conquering time, the 
spatial is neglected.  
Conclusion 
While India may enter the twenty-first century on the brink of the biggest 
transformation in its history, the dissemination of its benefits is not expansive. If the 
glamorous economic prosperities have veiled the spatial discrepancies, including how 
extensive these economic prosperities are across a nation, what might address these 
spatial issues? Might fiction produce such a space that critically broaches the spatial 
discrepancies found in temporal leaps in globalization based on neoliberal principles? 
Harvey contends,  
Aesthetic judgments (as well as ‘redemptive’ artistic practices) have entered in as powerful 
criteria of political, and hence of social and economic, action. If aesthetic judgement 
prioritizes space over time, then it follows that spatial practices and concepts can, under 
certain circumstances become central to social action.” (207)  
While Hari Kunzru may argue that the novel is not the form to make obvious political 
statements16, Transmission itself is inseparable from political discourse. In writing 
about the global processes in the contemporary world, Kunzru already subjects 
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"#!See Kunzru’s interview with Brian Hurley. 
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Transmission as an agent of social action. The novel becomes a space that explores 
socio-political and economic issues and processes that are typically not found in the 
usual measurements of progress and development in global discourse. To return to 
Fukuyama briefly, the onrush of neoliberalism has merely cast democratic concerns to 
the periphery; but before democracy is extended to all citizens on the globe, can one 
really declare that there is a universal End of History? After all, Fukuyama is 
influenced by Hegel’s master-slave dialectic, but has the vast majority of the world’s 
population achieved dignity in mutual recognition? Transmission is certainly skeptical 
of this. One cannot ignore the figures who are almost invisible and float on the 
margins. In a bleakly comic vignette, at the Dubai golf resort Guy stays at, he 
encounters, “a Filipino dressed in dusky pink plus fours…Carolyn, a Singaporean 
woman dressed as a pink explorer…a pink South Asian bellhop (Bruce)…[and] a 
dark-skinned young man who was perhaps Indonesian” (166). But all too often, these 
subaltern figures are ignored in global discourse. And between Guy and Arjun, one 
might ask who gets the better end. With Arjun’s shaking transmission of Leela08, we 
might be inclined to assume that Arjun does, but nay. Neither characters get the better 
end, but at the same time, I argue that both do. In the end, Transmission is a novel 
more interested in unveiling the complicated, dialectical, and uneven processes of 
globalization than answering who gets the better end of it. Might the contemporary 
Anglophone novel, in raising awareness of social issues that have largely been 
enshrouded, function as an actor for social redistribution?  
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III 
Technocapitalizing Spooks in William Gibson’s Spook Country 
 
A community will evolve only when people control their own communication. 
$ Frantz Fanon 
 
Technology is both the site of emancipation and domination. As the third 
millennium unfolds, the unrelenting expansion of information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) is relentlessly accelerating globalization, thereby continuing to 
transform the production of an emergent postmodern economy marked by neoliberal 
principles and accompanied by networked societies aggrandized by cyberspace. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, globalization is not as much about Americanization 
as it is about the onrush of neoliberalism (as much as its roots may stem from the 
United States), powered largely by the digital/IT revolution. This, however, does not 
mean that the days of imperialism are over; rather, it signifies that colonization has 
advanced under yet another veil. If the veil has been lifted in modernity as a realism 
which attempts to provide forms of representation to comprehend capitalist 
industrialist development and imperialism, it has returned in this cybernetic and 
highly networked postmodern epoch of late capitalism as a much more complex and 
abstract formation than ever before.  
The previous chapter examined Hari Kunzru’s Transmission (2005) and the 
portrayal of the kaleidoscopic and cyber-frenzied world we now live in as an 
alternative lens to the dominant narrative of globalization, which justifies itself by 
quantitative measures such as temporal leaps in scientific and economic developments 
that largely ignore spatial discrepancies. I argued that contemporary literary fiction 
thus provides a spatial form to critically broach global processes neglected in 
mainstream views of globalization, thereby prompting social action. This chapter 
seeks to examine the novel’s cultural reaction to postmodernity by expanding on the 
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concept of ghosts explored in chapter one, and elaborating on the social and political 
role of literary fiction broached in chapter two. I will argue that market capitalism has 
become technocapitalism in the militarization and weaponization of the body politic 
in the United States, as technology plays an increasingly significant role in 
concentrating ownership and by extension, power; further, technology has vastly 
contributed to the intense expansions and modulations of capitalist spatiality in the 
twenty-first century. These developments unquestionably transform geopolitics in the 
twenty-first century. Given these circumstances, it is necessary to consider how 
colonization resurfaces in our postmodern twenty-first century world in spite of the 
broad decolonization witnessed in the last century. 
To this end, I turn to William Gibson’s cyberpunk novel, Spook Country 
(2007). As I have argued in chapter one, literature is neither ahistorical nor apolitical. 
As such, literary aesthetics transform in different epochs to parallel the conditions to 
which the contemporary is subjected. In the current moment of late capitalism, fiction 
has taken a postmodern cultural turn, marked by what Fredric Jameson defines as “the 
full entry of art into the world of commodity production” (GA xii). Many critics have 
lambasted Gibson for writing "best-seller" novels largely driven by profit for the 
publishing companies, resulting in novels that fail to enlighten readers about little of 
anything. However, as James Kneale suggests, “it might make sense to read 
[Gibson’s] novels as narratives, exploring the ways in which they are plotted in time 
and space” because “it is not what happens that is striking, but how these stories are 
told,” which are “ways of making meaning” (EPD 183). Indeed, the cultural 
conditions of our time seems to necessitate that fiction, in order to have any hope for 
success (whether as a money-generating or thought-provoking medium), becomes 
involved in our world of commodity production. This may be, in the current context, 
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the most effective way of getting the greatest number of people thinking about the 
very contemporary problems (what with all the distractions we have in contemporary 
society now) we face, and as Raymond Williams (1977) suggested, bringing people to 
think about and discuss their situation provides the framework for practical 
consciousness, which is the beginning of a long revolution. 
 
Cyberpunk setting, global context 
 
For those who are not techno-geeks, Spook Country’s jargon may be 
unfamiliar, even daunting. On every page we inhabit a strange world of techno-babble 
of not only the basics such as the iPod, WiFi and WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy, 
already superseded by WPA), but “locative art,” GPS grids, geohacking, Handspring 
Treo smartphones, Virgin RIFID and geo-spatial tagging systems. All this is naturally 
par for the course in the hi-tech world of espionage and counter-surveillance, which is 
the kind of world Spook Country is set in, and also the very world we live in.17 
William Gibson has said in many interviews before, that science fiction (SF) is not so 
much about the future, as it is about the present. What we find in our present is the 
increasing consumption of these technological commodities, and the increase of 
wealth and power amongst those who run the system that allowed for this 
proliferation of technology. Thus, critics have described cyberpunk fiction as a 
metaphor for the ills of globalization – the highhanded and audacious power of 
corporations, corrupt and feeble governments, and oppressive surveillance societies, 
all of which have been emphatically abetted by information technology and 
cybernetics. As a movement, cyberpunk seeks to break down the black and white and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 By no means am I suggesting that everyone has access to these cool hi-tech gadgets. However, I do 
believe that everyone is living within a system driven by these technologies. 
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paint the world in shades of grey, blurring the lines between natural and artificial, 
organic and mechanical, real and virtual.  
Spook Country opens with Hollis Henry, a hard up faded pop star and former 
member of the Curfew band, now turned freelance journalist, who has just arrived in 
Los Angeles, which “had much more to do with her financial situation than with any 
powers of persuasion” (Gibson 3), on assignment for a magazine (that may or may not 
exist) called Node, to investigate "locative art," which uses global positioning systems 
(GPS) and WiFi to create forms of cyber-reality. Hollis eventually realizes that her 
boss, branding tycoon Hubertus Bigend (a figure who is all too familiar to those who 
have read Gibson’s 2003 Pattern Recognition), is using her to track a cargo container 
that turns out to be closely monitored by at least two other secret organizations, which 
have contracted individuals who specialize in one skill and one skill only to be 
puppets in a larger scheme. Milgrim is a junkie fluent in Volapuk, an artificial 
language in the form of “a visual approximation of Cyrillic, the Russian alphabet” 
(Gibson 23) “faked up” by the Russians when they first “got themselves computers” 
and found that “the keyboards and screen displays were Roman, not Cyrillic” (24). He 
has been kidnapped by Brown, a man with a large supply of pharmaceuticals and a 
need to eavesdrop on Volapuk text messages between members of an elite Cuban-
Chinese spy family with ties to the CIA and the KGB, and have direct bearing on Tito, 
a Cuban ninja who slips data-encrypted iPods to an operative in the shoe department 
of Prada in hopes that this old man can shed light on his father, who died under 
mysterious circumstances. 
Spook Country thus triangulates the Hollis/Bigend narrative with two other 
plot lines, each told from the point of view of someone with a limited understanding 
of their role in some obviously larger and certainly dangerous dynamic. It is obvious, 
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then, that these characters are all fit into a system.18 Through each short chapter that 
shifts the action to not only a different character, but also to another location, Spook 
Country cinematically crafts the seemingly disparate worlds of a cast of spies, artists, 
and losers who collide in the rolling turmoil of twenty-first century destabilized 
geopolitics. The narrative moves between the perspectives of spooks who may or may 
not be working for or affiliated with the United States government, and cyberpunk 
artists very much implicated in the transnational corporate culture that enables their 
work. Everything that qualifies these characters to perform the tasks they are assigned 
to qualifies their place within and their identity as a specialist within the division of 
labor in the system. Everything that equips them to penetrate these networks that they 
are a part of, also makes them vulnerable to the latter’s manipulation. That is, those 
who wield power within these networks, to which we will return. 
None of the narratives can stand alone to illuminate the narrative complexity 
of Spook Country, with its fugue-like advancement of these melodies toward an oddly 
harmonic resolution at a port in Vancouver. The resolution in Vancouver, however, is 
not the crucial point, because Gibson did not engineer this techno-thriller with a 
labyrinthine conspiracy plot to disclose the meaning at its core, for the maze is the 
message. Jameson explains: 
in order for narrative to project some sense of a totality of experience in space and 
time, it must surely know some closure (a narrative must have an ending, even if it is 
ingeniously organized around the structural repression of endings as such). At the 
same time, however, closure or the narrative ending is the mark of the boundary or 
limit beyond which thought cannot go. The merit of SF is to dramatize this 
contradiction on the level of plot itself, since the vision of future history cannot know 
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18 In Towards 2000, Raymond Williams explains that “[t]he danger now, as has been widely if 
obscurely recognized, is of fitting human beings to a system, rather than a system to human beings” 
(31). Gibson’s characters feel like high-tech automatons with useful features but have little to no 
autonomy. Albeit flowing with wry thoughts about their situations, they do not seem to make many 
actual choices. Rather, external forces and cagey operatives push and pull them along. This is 
problematic because, contrary to the recognition and dignity that people receive, which Fukuyama 
anticipates as result of the world having reached an end of History, there is actually a reduction of 
humanity to commodity value based on the skills each person possesses. It is difficult, then, to perceive 
that humanity has indeed progressed. 
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any punctual ending of this kind, at the same time that its novelistic expression 
demands some such ending. (AF 283) 
 
As Jameson suggests, closure marks the place where thought cannot go, which is 
precisely why the resolution in Vancouver is neither imperative nor interesting 
compared to the forces that led each character to that final destination, in the sense 
that it is not responsible for providing us with a detailed and concise resolution for the 
plexus of problems broached in the novel. This would simply render the novel as a 
dogmatic statement with the power of omniscience. Instead, the trivialization of the 
resolution begs readers to examine the processes that led up to the denouement, for in 
our reality, we are still – and indefinitely so – trapped in the postmodern flux without 
a resolution. In fact, with the world now so densely networked, it is inconceivable to 
even entertain the possibility of a totalizing solution for all of globalization’s ills; to 
entertain this possibility would be very reductive, and would render Gibson’s novel 
entirely as a meaningless commodity, which would signify that literature and culture 
are in a crisis. As Lance Olsen writes in Postmodern Culture, “[t]he very name 
cyberpunk fuses and confuses the techno-sphere of cybernetics, cybernauts, and, most 
of all, computer hacking, with the countercultural socio-sphere of punk” (1994).  
Embedded within the cyberpunk subgenre is an attitude of resistance to the 
dark and gritty, and painfully realistic vision of our world system dominated by 
megacorporations and their breathtaking tech gadgets. If the novel is indeed 
omniscient, it is certainly a limited omniscience only to the extent that it provides 
readers a distance to examine the complex networks that conceal these 
megacorporations’ pervasive power and dominance in the world, government, society, 
all the way down to our very individual and private lives. Spook Country – with its 
characters who are deeply affected and driven by corporate culture, technoculture, 
and political culture of the 1960s to some dismal time in the future – is undoubtedly 
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the pure expression of science fiction as a geopolitical aesthetic in writing about and 
seeking to describe an unthinkable present through the veil of technology and 
speculation. As such, it resonates out of modern history; it is a mimesis of what we 
know is happening in the global processes of our present, but cannot entirely grasp, 
because our reality, like the novel’s narrative complexity, is a compilation of plexuses 
that promise to be self-sustaining and individual entities unto themselves, but are 
actually a part of an even larger dynamic. Thus, Spook Country is Gibson’s intense 
visual imaging of the network behind the screen, the cyberspace – the ungraspable 
virtual space in postmodernity. This, however, does not mean that material space is no 
longer pertinent, for there are sharp details of cityscapes which are both set against 
and empowering technology at the same time. To understand this, we will consider 
the emergence of technocapitalism, and the novel’s portrayal of the global city. 
Technocapitalism and the global city: blurring the real and virtual 
 
While many believe that the IT/digital revolution has contributed to the spread 
of democratic values and democracy itself,19 it has also been argued by many that 
technological proliferation perpetuates the interests of the dominant economic and 
political powers, intensifies divisions between haves and have-nots, and is a defining 
feature of global technocapitalism. Jameson thus argues that capitalist spatiality has 
taken the form of virtual space, and in turn, we have seen intense expansions and 
modulations of capitalist spatiality in cyberspace. Because intangibles such as 
creativity and knowledge are at the core of technocapitalism, and involves the 
emergence of a stage of capitalism in which technology is incorporated in its global 
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19 For example, Dahlberg and Siapera, in their introduction to Radical Democracy and the Internet, 
claim that “[u]nder the influence of neo-liberalism, media systems throughout the world have been 
rapidly undergoing commercialization, privatization, and de/re-regulation, and subsequently merging 
into global mega-media corporations” (2), and within the urgencies of this ideological hegemony, 
“there has been excitement,” as an alternative to mainstream media, “about the possibility of the 
Internet supporting, advancing, and enhancing autonomous and democratic public spaces” (3). 
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infrastructure, producing novel forms of economy, society, technopolitics, and 
technoculture in what Manuel Castells calls a networked society20 necessarily brings 
the global city to the fore. 
The Global City and its Discontents 
 
It might seem rather absurd to jump from an intangible cyberspace to the 
material space of global cities, especially when futurologists are anticipating the 
demise of the city in light of the development of ICTs. The idea that virtual space is 
the node of advanced capitalism urges us, however, to recover concrete place in 
analyzing the global economy, particularly place as constituted in major cities, 
“[b]ecause,” as Saskia Sassen argues, “it allows us to see the multiplicity of 
economies and work cultures in which the global information economy is embedded” 
(GD xix-xx). In The Global City, Sassen writes, “[g]lobal cities are, however, not 
only nodal points for the coordination of processes; they are also particular sites of 
production” (5) of specialized services and financial innovations and the making of 
the market, such that they become the command and control centers in coordinating, 
innovating, and managing the intertwined activities of networks of firms (usually 
transnational) that are at the core of global economic processes.21 While technology 
(as well as finance capital) is critical to maintaining these networks, the global 
corporations which require highly skilled labor to manage not only these networks, 
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20 Castells defines network as “a set of interconnected nodes. A node is the point at which a curve 
intersects itself. What a node is, concretely speaking, depends on the kind of concrete networks of 
which we speak. They are stock exchange markets, and their ancillary advanced service centers, in the 
network of global financial flows. They are national councils of ministers and European 
Commissioners in the political network that governs the European Union. They are coca fields and 
poppy fields, clandestine laboratories, secret landing strips, street gangs, and money-laundering 
financial institutions in the network of drug traffic that penetrates economies, societies, and states 
throughout the world. They are television systems, entertainment studios, computer graphics milieux, 
news teams, and mobile devices generating, transmitting, and receiving signals in the global network of 
the new media at the roots of cultural expression and public opinion in the Information Age” (NS 501).!
21 For example, companies in the advanced services including finance, insurance, real estate, consulting, 
legal services, advertising, design, marketing, public relations, security, information gathering, 
management of information systems, and even scientific innovation; all of which can be reduced to 
knowledge generation and information flows. 
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which are becoming increasingly complex, but also to produce the very ICTs that 
enable networking, are nevertheless headquartered in global cities. Castells writes, 
“the Internet cannot bypass mega-cities: it depends on the telecommunications and on 
the ‘telecommunicators’ located in those centers” (NS 440). The material space of 
global cities, thus, remain relevant in analyzing advanced capitalism as they are 
production sites of postmodern capitalist modulations. In this way, global cities are 
the sites of technocapitalist proliferation, and in order to understand advanced 
capitalism in its latest form of technocapitalism, we need to consider the capitalist 
spatiality of both cyberspace and the global city, and analyze how they complement 
one another.  
While I argued that Spook Country is Gibson’s intense visual imaging of the 
network behind the screen – the cyberspace – I also observed that each short chapter 
transitions to a different location – Los Angeles, Buenos Aires, New York, and 
Vancouver, with references to London, Brussels, Havana, Mexico City and San Jose – 
in a bombastic evocation of our interconnected and globalized world. It is critical to 
note that while the pervasiveness of cybernetics in our everyday lives may appear to 
be the focal point of the novel, Gibson also turns readers’ attention towards physical 
location. Castells writes, “space is not a reflection of society, it is its expression” (NS 
440). “In other words,” he says, “space is not a photocopy of society, it is society,” 
thus “spatial forms and processes are formed by the dynamics of the overall social 
structure” (440). He proclaims that “space is crystallized time” (440). As Gibson’s 
characters traverse through the space of global cities, they witness a wide variety of 
micronized processes, often contradictory and conflicting, that shape the cities, 
allowing readers in turn to analyze society and its historical formations.  
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For example, the onrush of neoliberalism in the last thirty years profoundly 
changed New York City, as in many other global cities. Gibson draws readers to 
conceptualize these changes through Milgrim, who is addicted to narcotics likely 
because of social dynamics: 
Milgrim remembered Union Square from twenty years before, when it had been a 
place of broken benches and litter, where a corpse might go unremarked amid the 
huddled and unmoving bodies of the homeless. It had been a flagrant drug bazaar, in 
those days, when Milgrim himself had had no need of such a place. But now it was 
Barnes & Noble, Circuit City, Whole Foods, Virgin, and he, Milgrim, had gone 
equally far, it sometimes seemed, in the opposite direction. (Gibson 231) 
 
When Milgrim is caught by the men Mr. Birdwell, his East Village dealer, sent 
somewhere near Union Square and they witness a crime, one of the men says “[T]his 
place supposed to be gentrified…Two million a unit, here” (246). What we witness in 
this scene is exactly what the man says – gentrification – which in this case, is a 
process in which corporations “discover” a neighborhood as a strategic site for 
generating profit by establishing their businesses catered to a haut monde, and that 
attracts more affluent residents, which drives up the price of housing, and begins to 
drive out some of the very people who turned over the neighborhood. And over the 
course of time, gentrification begins to change the essential character of the 
neighborhood, which becomes safer, more comfortable and less edgy. But what about 
those who were pushed out of up-and-coming neighborhoods like Union Square and 
East Village, in the gentrification process, such as Milgrim? Or Tito, who may or may 
not be a legal immigrant in the United States, and who Milgrim finds interesting 
because he is an illegal facilitator “who spoke Russian and messaged in Volapuk” and 
also “lived in windowless mini-lofts on the fringes of Chinatown, wore APC and 
played keyboards” (157)? Tito is an embodiment of those very contradictions found 
in the global city: a combination of skills and talent and brand name products 
implicated in money and power, poor living conditions for those who are left out by 
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the flourishing formal economy, and the growth of an informal economy resulting in 
part from the growing inequality in profit-making capabilities in different sectors of 
the urban and global economy.22 We thus see a part of the city that is steadily built up 
by corporations and finance capital, which tends too often to veil the public space 
marked by social inequalities. 
There is a political, as inseparable as it may be from the economic, reason for 
this phenomenon in which the globalization of the economy results in global cities 
concentrating “a disproportionate share of global corporate power and are one of the 
key sites for its valorization” while also concentrating “a disproportionate share of the 
disadvantaged and are one of the key sites for their devalorization” (GD xxiv). As 
mentioned in the last chapter, the proliferation of economic developments (in 
whatever form they may come in in our postmodern world), has a lot to do with 
making a place globally competitive. In the twenty-first century, global cities – 
despite their being an alleged denationalized place – are the metonymic places of a 
nation’s economy. One of the first things Michael Bloomberg said when he became 
the mayor of New York was “We’re not going to offer any subsidies to corporations 
to come here. If a corporation needs a subsidy to locate, in this high cost, high quality, 
wonderful location [emphasis mine] of New York City, if they need a subsidy to 
come here, then we don’t want them. We only want corporations that can afford to be 
here.” According to David Harvey, Bloomberg “didn’t say that about people, but, in 
fact, that policy carries over to people” (2007) as there is now an out migration from 
New York City of low income people because they can no longer afford to live there, 
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22 Sassen’s informal economy refers “to those income-generating activities occurring outside the state’s 
regulatory framework it evades. For this reason, the informal economy can only be understood in terms 
of its relationship to the formal economy – that is, regulated, income-generated activity” (GD 153). 
Tito’s situation is interesting because the nature of his work already renders him as part of the informal 
economy. However, what he has been contracted to do in the novel involves the shipping container, 
which is also part of the informal economy mostly because it is illegal, but derives its resources from 
the formal economy, so long as they wield political power to support and facilitate the process.  
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unless they live in ghettoes. Interestingly, the Information Age renders closed 
societies incapable of competing. New York City is definitely not closed as it is a 
focal node in the global economy; however, it is closed in the sense that it seeks to be 
elitist, very much in the same way as Kunzru’s Guy Swift wants the EU to project 
itself as a club everyone wants to be a part of, but is exclusive. It limits access and 
offers an assurance of exclusivity among those present. Thus, “New York,” Castells 
writes, “is a dual city most fundamentally because its spatial restructuring has 
included some distinct segments of society in the making of history while excluding 
others” (DC 417). Consider Hollis’ dual life for example. Much of her working life 
takes place in the more trendy and gentrified parts of Los Angeles, which benefits 
from and can easily access technological resources, thus caters to the dominant class23 
whose interests and organizational powers arise within a space of flows; “that is,” 
Castells writes, “networks that transmit and facilitate the analysis of economically and 
politically relevant information” (DC 415). Even her sleeping place has to be a 
fashionable designer hotel located on the glamorous Sunset Strip in the modern and 
luxurious Mondrian. And yet, we find her eating a “dollar-fifty-nine barbecue beef rib 
with broasted potatoes” from Mr. Sippee, which is located near the “tents under the 
freeway” and caters “to an eclectic clientele of the more functionally homeless, sex 
workers of varied gender and presentation, pimps, police officers, drug dealers, office 
workers, artists, musicians, the map-lost as well as the life-lost” (Gibson 195). This 
contrast is unsettling, to say the very least, but it is not unexpected given the course of 
globalization. 
New York and Los Angeles, thus, engage in a kind of Third-World situation 
somehow within the world system as their citizens are in their city boxes marked by 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 I find Castell’s definition of the dominant class as “the managerial technocracy allied to the global 
financial elite” with “a distinct spatial logic” useful in understanding technocratic societies. 
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prosperity and constriction all at once, and the loss of nature to modern conditions of 
production. Castells writes, “[t]he Information Age is ushering in a new urban form, 
the informational city…because of the nature of the new society, based upon 
knowledge, organized around networks, and partly made up of flows, the 
informational city is not a form but a process, a process characterized by the structural 
domination of the space of flows” (NS 429). Castells has written elsewhere that “[t]he 
formation of a unified world economy organized around the ability to communicate 
and process information has generated both the global city and the informational city, 
expressed in its ability to centralize and control the information flows on which 
multinational corporations rely,” thus “the dual city is the social expression of the 
emerging spatial form of postindustrial society, while the global city is its economic 
expression, and the informational city is its technological expression” (DC 415). As 
Spook Country’s characters traverse through these global and informational cities, 
they unravel the cities not as a constant, but as a process that is constantly reproduced 
in a regeneration and renewal in correlation to the current means of production, 
namely creative talent and knowledge. 
 
The Informational City and the Precession of Simulacra 
 
 In the current era, technology and information are the decisive tools in 
generating profits and in appropriating market shares. This means that intangibles 
such as creativity and knowledge become the core means of production in the current 
phase of capitalism. This current phase of capitalism rooted in technological 
innovation and corporate power is technocapitalism. New sectors closely associated 
with technocapitalism are emerging out of systematized invention and innovation, 
which results in creativity becoming a commodity. According to Luis Saurez-Villa, 
the very person who coined the term technocapitalism, there are two types of 
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phenomena supporting the rise of technocapitalism: the macro – found at the level of 
the societal, and the micro, which involves processes of diffusion and generation of 
new knowledge that can lead to invention and innovation, such as locative art.  
As already mentioned, Spook Country opens with Hollis Henry flying into Los 
Angeles on an assignment to investigate locative art. Within the very same chapter, 
Alberto, a locative artist, demonstrates the technology by showing a holograph of 
River Phoenix’s corpse (a tragic victim of Hollywood’s lethal cocktail of religion, 
drugs, and celebrity) lying face down on the sidewalk outside of The Viper Room – in 
the exact place where River Phoenix’s corpse actually lay more than ten years ago. 
Locative art is fascinating because they are effective virtual renditions of site-specific 
incidents. In other words, they are virtual reality illusions that demonstrate 
cyberspace’s capacity to evert into our everyday reality. According to Bobby Chombo, 
Spook Country’s leading locative artist, “once it everts, then there isn’t any 
cyberspace, is there?” but “[t]here never was, if you want to look at it that way. It was 
a way we had of looking where we were headed, a direction” (Gibson 86). Bobby’s 
enigmatic observation epitomizes Saurez-Villa’s assertion that “[t]he microlevel 
elements form the backbone from which the macro components emerge, providing a 
vast collection of actions and decisions that eventually result in systemic change” (IT 
228). The goal of cyberspace was to infuse it with our everyday reality, making 
certain intangibles more concrete to our imagination. However, instead of cyberspace 
functioning as a virtual rendition for that which cannot or no longer be experienced as 
a concretely physical phenomenon, cyberspace has become a part of reality itself. 
Bobby reminds us of how locative art is spatially embedded: “With the grid, we’re 
here. This is the other side of the screen. Right here” (Gibson 86). In locative art, 
what we see is a blurring of the virtual and the real – “[c]artographic attributes of the 
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invisible” (31) in Hollis’ words. There is an “artist annotating every centimeter of a 
place, of every physical thing” and it promises to be “visible to all” (31), that is, all 
who have access to the locative pieces (which needless to say, is an elite few). 
Though the access to technological developments does not extend to everyone, 
the impacts of their existence certainly have turned the world upside down. Guy 
Debord writes, “[i]n societies dominated by modern conditions of production, life is 
presented as an immense accumulation of spectacles,” such that “[e]verything that 
was directly lived has receded into a representation” (SS 7). “The spectacle,” Debord 
explains, “is a concrete inversion of life, an autonomous movement of the nonliving,” 
and presents itself “simultaneously as society itself, as a part of society, and as a 
means of unification” (SS 7). Los Angeles, having long been a symbol of 
contradictions in America – extraordinary wealth, cutting-edge technology, but with a 
vast chasm between the rich and the poor – and being the entertainment capital of the 
world, leading the world in the creation of technological artifices such as television 
and stage production, motion pictures, video games, and recorded music, has long 
been the archetype of a society as a spectacle. After meeting Alberto and experiencing 
locative art, Hollis 
walked back to the Mondrian through that weird, evanescent moment that belongs to 
every sunny morning in West Hollywood, when some strange perpetual promise of 
chlorophyll and hidden, warming fruit graces the air, just before the hydrocarbon 
blanket settles in. That sense of some peripheral and prelapsarian beauty, of 
something a little more than a hundred years past, but in that moment achingly 
present, as though the city were something you could wipe from your glasses and 
forget. (Gibson 34)  
 
This is a rare but exhilarating moment when Gibson allows reality to break through 
the surreal and polluted artifice of Los Angeles’ modern metropolis. According to 
Baudrillard, Los Angeles is surrounded by “imaginary stations that feed reality, the 
energy of the real to a city whose mystery is precisely that of no longer being 
anything but a network of incessant, unreal circulation – a city of incredible 
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proportions but without space, without dimension” (Simulacra and Simulation, 13). In 
short, everyday living has been colonized by capitalist productions and 
commodification in becoming increasingly embroiled in the “precession of 
simulacra,” in exact copies or representations of everyday reality that somehow 
substitute for the real itself, while concealing that the real is no longer real. 
 This postmodern condition of society as a spectacle seems to prompt a 
nostalgic desire to return to an older period and to live its strange old aesthetic 
artefacts through once again. As Tito moves through New York City, he is 
accompanied by his family gods, guerrero warriors and spirits, both real and 
imagined: 
The Guerreros took him up Broadway, through the sunlight. He hadn’t expected this, 
assuming he’d reach Union Square by subway, then round and circle until the time of 
his meeting. But no, and so he walked with them, just as they led him. And soon he 
was simply a man walking, the orishas spread through a seemingly ordinary 
awareness, invisible as drops of ink in a volume of water, his pulse steady, enjoying 
the look of the sun on the floral ironwork that supported many of these old buildings. 
This was, he knew, though he avoided directly considering it, a still higher state of 
readiness. (Gibson 221) 
 
Sharp details of the cityscape are set against Tito’s memory of black NYU student 
freerunners from Dominican Republic who would call him “China” (222), building up 
to an unforgettable chase through the New York streets and squares, conjuring a 
balletic spirit of freedom, and defiance - not only of gravity but of sinister controllers. 
These are perhaps the memorable moments that Tito can recollect about New York, 
and “in this place that is a palimpsest, subjectivity is already linked to the absence that 
structures it as existence and makes it ‘be there’” (Certeau 109). While the global and 
informational city has become a spectacle, it is also a place of crystallized and 
historical time, revealing the processes that shaped/s and reshaped/s it into its 
postmodern form.  
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In a nostalgic moment reminiscing her late friend and former Curfew band 
member, Jimmy Carlyle, Hollis says, “t]he world is already weirder and stupider than 
you could ever have guessed” (Gibson 160), because technological proliferation has 
complicated and transformed reality. Technology, as a means of production, has 
complex relations with deep political and economic transformations that profoundly 
change social and cultural relationships. Bobby Chombo tells Hollis, “if you hadn’t 
been told [the virtual rendition] was here, there’d be no way for you to find it, unless 
you had its URL and its GPS coordinates, and if you have those, you know it’s here” 
(Gibson 87). Knowledge, as Chombo, suggests, has to do with accessibility then. He 
proceeds to declare that “[t]he world we walk around in would be channels,” like 
blogs in which “each one is actually trying to describe reality” (87), or rather, create it. 
Technology is part of the way we find our way through the material world, be it 
through GPS coordinates or the Internet. “But,” Bobby continues as Gibson tries to 
convey a subtler message, “when you look at blogs, where you’re most likely to find 
the real info is in the links. It’s contextual, and not only who the blog’s linked to, but 
who’s linked to the blog” (87-8). In a sweepingly dense metaphor, Gibson manages to 
raise the question of “who?” leading to a series of critical questions – who is linked? 
who derives money, knowledge, and by extension, power from all of this? who has 
the most to lose? The simple answer is: everyone is involved. However, it is the 
companies that control the means of production, and military and political leaders 
who control the levers of power that “all are linked, sometimes informally, sometimes 
quite closely, but often with the effect of amplifying their power and securing their 
station – and implicitly with the consequence of heightening inequity within society” 
(Rothkopf 14). 
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All indicators, whether through inequalities and uneven development or 
simulation, point to a strengthening of the hierarchical structure of command-and-
control functions and the resulting exchange of information in spaces, whether 
through cities or cyberspace (sometimes they may not necessarily be distinguishable). 
As the globalization of the economy continues to grow, cities increasingly become the 
strategic site of global (and) technological capital. It is unsurprising, then, for 
different governments to have a vested interest in making their global cities as the 
symbol of high life and society. By doing so, they can attract more investors, and by 
extension capital, which results in world-class standing, and symbolizes power 
derived from a class prerogative associated with place.24 As Bloomberg’s earlier 
statement indicates, there is a strong correlation between a quality place – marked by 
gentrification and glamorization (and simulation, too) – and quality investment – 
marked by the steady influx of capital brought about by (foreign) businesses, which 
according to Harvey, is often supported by the U.S. military, and again, shedding light 
on the very fact that national politics are still relevant.25 What all of this inevitably 
suggest is that power is concentrated in the hands of a remarkably small number of 
people around the world. 
 
Superclass: The Global Elite and Privatization 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 This is tricky because denizens from these global cities, within my own experience, notably Los 
Angeles, New York, and Shanghai – tend to carry themselves as if they have an autonomous identity 
(usually with a touch of elitism) disassociated with the collective national one. However, under certain 
circumstances, national identification becomes pertinent for these people. Once again, as 
denationalized a platform the global city may allege to be, it has a complex dynamic with the national 
which makes it difficult to render the nation as obsolescent in spite of an increasingly globalized world 
that many have argued marks a period of postnationalism. 
25 Sassen has also argued that, “[e]ven though transnationalism and deregulation have reduced the role 
of the state in the governance of economic processes, the state remains as the ultimate guarantor of 
rights of capital whether national or foreign. Firms operating transnationally want to ensure the 
functions traditionally exercised by the state in the national realm of the economy. Notably 
guaranteeing property rights and contracts. The state here can be conceived of as representing a 
technical administrative capacity which cannot be replicated at this time by any other institutional 
arrangement; further, this is a capacity backed by military power” (GD 199). 
 84 
In many ways, technology is the sidekick to global cities in the increasing 
privatization of capital and resources. Castells explains “major metropolitan centers 
still offer the greatest opportunities for personal enhancement, social status, and 
individual self-gratification of the much-needed upper-level professionals, from good 
schools for their children to symbolic membership at the heights of conspicuous 
consumption, including art and entertainment” (NS 416). Likewise, “e-mail, Web 
pages, Weblogs, open publishing/editing systems, peer-to-peer connections, 
Webcasting, podcasting, and other interactive, relatively low cost, and (somewhat) 
globally accessible computer networked communications, [can be] seen as providing 
space for the free flow of information, open debate of problems, and the formation of 
rational-critical public opinion, all of which enable citizen scrutiny of power and input 
into decision-making” (Dahlberg and Siapera 3). Both the global city and cyberspace 
are seen as spaces where opportunities and accessibility are open to their denizens and 
netizens, thereby empowering them. In this respect, both spaces are emancipatory. 
However, as Castells notes, these opportunities are largely restricted to a privileged 
group of people, as most of the world obviously does not even have telephone service, 
much less computers, or high-speed connections to access these so-called free flows 
of information or time to consider questions of personal enhancement and self-
gratification. Anyone who assumes that globalization suggests that place no longer 
matters because of the accelerated spread of information via technology, is 
subscribing to the dominant narrative that concerns itself with only the upper circuits 
of capital, and not the lower ones. Thus, the arbitrary and one-sided notion that global 
cities are places of opportunities is crafted to fit a particular narrative in which its 
authors also want to advocate that there is in fact a correlation between the spread of 
democracy and the proliferation of the Internet.  
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If globalization has indeed marked the end of history, and all states are either 
practicing liberal democracies or moving towards a democratic form of government in 
one way or another as Francis Fukuyama suggests, why might it still be necessary to 
fabricate such a narrowly delusive narrative of globalization and its components? As I 
have suggested earlier in this chapter, colonization and domination have not ended, 
and have merely veiled under a different guise. “While neoliberalization,” David 
Harvey contends, “may have been about the restoration of class power, it has not 
necessarily meant the restoration of economic power to the same people” (BHN 31). 
The short answer to the previous question, then, is that the “postindustrial [globalized] 
era is no exception of a dominant class,” which in this case, is the global financial 
elite, “which has a distinct spatial logic” of transnationalism in global and 
informational cities that need to construct new forms of consent amongst the masses 
(DC 415). Neoliberalism, according to Harvey, captures “ideals of individual 
freedom,” turns “them against the interventionist and regulatory practices of the state” 
and is “backed up by a practical strategy that emphasized the liberty of consumer 
choice, not only with respect to particular products but also with respect to lifestyles, 
modes of expression, and a wide range of cultural practices” (BHN 42). Hence, the 
alluring gentrified surface of metropolitan centers that promise individual freedom, 
diversity, opportunities, and an overall better quality of life is ascribed to neoliberal 
globalization. 
Privacy v. Privatization 
 
 Under the neoliberal state, all actors in the market are generally presumed to 
have access to the same information, especially with the proliferation of technology, 
which has led to the possibility of the Internet supporting, advancing, and enhancing 
autonomous and democratic spaces. Dahlberg and Siapera elaborate: 
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Through its mythological non-hierarchical network of free information flows, the 
Internet is seen as offering a perfect ‘marketplace of ideas’, a space for information 
exchange and individual decision-making free of bureaucracy, administrative power, 
and other restrictions (bodily, geographical, cultural) of ‘real’ space. Democracy here 
is equated with the liberty of individuals to satisfy private interests. (3) 
The cyberspace of the Internet, thus, parallels the metropolis in what it promises to 
hold in store. In fact, the Internet arguably, through its virtuality and non-materiality, 
is a utopian space of a more radical concept of freedom and democracy as it is 
theoretically easier to satisfy private interests with the click of a mouse, free from the 
restrictions of material space and the power structures that come with it. Evgeny 
Morozov, however, observes that “[t]he idea that the Internet favors the oppressed 
rather than the oppressor is marred by what I call cyber-utopianism: a naïve belief in 
the emancipatory nature of online communication that rests on a stubborn refusal to 
acknowledge its downside” (ND xiii). Furthermore, I argue that the premise of the 
notion that the Internet is a space of radical democracy derives from a facile 
conflation of privacy and privatization, between which we must necessarily 
distinguish. 
 When Hollis wakes up from her first night of deployment in Vancouver, 
Oliver Sleight of Blue Ant Vancouver informs her that Bigend has sent her a 
scrambler for her cellphone which “uses a digital encryption algorithm” that “rolls the 
scrambling code up to about sixty thousand times,” used exclusively for phone 
conversations between the two (Gibson 348). Rather unperturbed by and perhaps even 
insouciant to the mentality that leads to the desire of such hyper-security and 
protection of privacy, Hollis’ subsequent pithiness with Oliver suggests a markedly 
blasé attitude towards technological breaches of the free flow of data transmission. 
After all, prior to meeting Bigend, she had a “primeval fear that he’d caught her 
Googling him, peering into his Wiki” (100) when his first phone call to her came 
immediately after she leeched Wi-Fi from “trusted wireless network SpaDeLites47” 
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(99), which she assumed was in the period apartment building across the street from 
her hotel room, and Googled him. Given the digital revolution of the Information Age, 
the flow of information is accelerated, and can easily be rerouted. In this digital 
frenzy, it is small wonder that Hollis is paranoid that her Internet activity can easily, 
and likely, be tracked, especially over a network unprotected by WEP. For Hollis, this 
digital tracking or rerouting of information is of a relatively petty concern that an 
elusive employer may discover and decide that a prying and intrusive employee is 
inappropriate for which he hired her. For Bigend, however, the free flow of data is a 
much more serious problem as he is “increasingly concerned with privacy” in spite of 
however relative it may be because at the least, the scramblers will make their phone 
conversations “more private than…not” having them (350). At a time when it is 
broadly believed that the digital revolution has facilitated the dissemination of 
democratic values and democracy itself through the accelerated spread of information, 
thereby rendering information public, Bigend seeks to privatize any and all data he 
collects in unraveling a government-backed scheme that is transnational in nature. 
Little does Hollis know, it is partially, and I emphasize partially, due to her 
inquisitiveness that esoterically qualifies her for the investigative task, veiled beneath 
the title of “investigative journalist,” that Bigend hired her for, rendering her 
vulnerable to his manipulation. Nevertheless, Hollis’ investigative work, as a matter 
of course, extends beyond uncovering a scheme for Bigend; as a character in literary 
fiction, she is a social detective “who can most often be identified as occupying the 
space and position of the intellectual as such: that unhappy consciousness, forever 
suspended between the classes, yet unable to disengage from class realities and 
functions, and from class guilt” (GA 38). As intimated earlier in this chapter, Hollis is 
deeply implicated in the concentration of international finance and power, living what 
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appears to be a glamorous and cutting-edge cosmopolitan lifestyle, with access to the 
latest trends and innovations driving culture, economics, and society; yet, we also find 
her eating at an edgy spot in Los Angeles, and learn that her family is far removed 
from the money, despite the luxury of wintering in Puerto Vallarta, and power that 
enables her experiences. Her father has apparently developed “a fierce and 
uncharacteristic interest in politics” because he says “it’s never been this bad,” but 
according to her mother, “it’s only because he never paid it this much attention 
before” (Gibson 312). “And it’s the Internet,” her mother explains. “People used to 
have to wait for the paper, or for the news on television” (312-3). The Internet is 
immediately cast as an actor of freedom and democracy through its users’ 
instantaneous accessibility to news, and by extension, knowledge. And presumably, 
knowledge is power, as the old adage goes. However, Hollis’ mother is quick to 
remind us, that although her father may be more aware of social and political currents, 
“it’s not like there’s anything he can do about any of it anyway” (313). While the 
Internet revolutionized the accessibility to mainstream news, it is hardly a panacea for 
all corporate ills and failed states. In recent decades, for instance, the privatization of 
a vast array of sectors has led to a concentration of ownership, which subsequently 
leads to a concentration of power; while this is practically a truism, it is not something 
one will likely hear in mainstream media, for financial flows are taking control of 
media empires that influence political processes. According to Nick Dyer-Witheford, 
“[w]ho commands which means of communication is a question critical in 
determining what articulations may or may not be made” (RD 196). “And in advanced 
capitalism,” he continues, “the conditions of discourse, both its proliferation and its 
blockages, are deeply set by corporate power” (196). If corporate power is behind the 
keen control and production of information and knowledge, how might one access 
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pure information and knowledge, unmarred and unfiltered by corporate 
commodification and manipulation? 
Hollis’ dualistic investigative work – as both an “investigative journalist” for 
Bigend and a literary social detective – in addition to her suspension between the 
corporate class and everyday class renders her as the ideal protagonist to discover raw 
knowledge of the dynamics in society and reveal covert operations that drive the elite 
foundations of society. Jameson explains, 
In any case, it will be the more general positioning of the intellectual in the social 
structure which endows the individual protagonist with collective resonance, which 
transforms policeman or journalist, photographer or even media figure, into a vehicle 
for judgments on society and revelations of its hidden [emphasis mine] nature, just as 
it refocuses the various individual or empirical events and actors into a representative 
pattern symptomatic of the social order as a whole. (GA 39) 
 
Although Hollis’ lifestyle may be implicated in corporate culture, which raises doubts 
of whether she has a collective resonance with the rest of society, it is precisely her 
implication in global corporate culture that provides her with the opportunities to 
experience the inner workings of society, which allows her to become a sort of 
correspondent – for readers – on the “hidden nature” of society that is not 
immediately available for many. Be that as it may, Bigend undoubtedly assigned 
Hollis to the locative-art beat not for her journalism,26 but primarily because her 
celebrity status as the former lead singer of the indie-rock band Curfew is the precise 
tool needed to pry access to the goal: locating a mysterious shipping container whose 
location is allegedly known only to Bobby Chombo. According to David Rothkopf, 
“in the current era, celebrity is power” because “[w]ith modern information 
technologies, celebrity amounts to the ability to command the attention of mass 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 I am, in essence, arguing that Hollis’ function as a literary character is oppositional to her role in 
Bigend’s venture, but the two are nonetheless discursively conjunctive. What I want to broach and 
examine, however, is the question of what might Hollis uncover about questions of privacy and 
privatization, and society at large through working covertly under the title of “investigative journalist” 
for Bigend. After all, “[o]ne f the scary things about Bigend, she supposed, was that with him you 
stood an actual chance of finding some things out” but broaches crucial questions: “And then where 
would you be? Were there things that were, in themselves, deeply problematic to learn?” (Gibson 230). 
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audiences,” and any star endorsing a product “is the power to generate revenue for a 
client, to draw consumers to merchandise or services associated with them” (S 236-7). 
It follows, then, that Bigend’s interest in the shipping container and subsequent 
creation of Node to probe the whereabouts of the container likely has more to do with 
concentrating power for himself through accumulating and exercising knowledge on 
covert operations than disclosing crucial information to the general public.  
 According to David Rothkopf, “[t]here is no single or universally accepted 
metric for power” and “[d]etermining who has it and who does not is made more 
difficult because some of the most influential among us commonly mask their power 
or use it infrequently” (S xiii). Hubertus Bigend is one such example. Indeed, the 
clandestinity of Node already raises suspicions regarding its existence and objective. 
Thus, Hollis’ qualms about the nature of her work and its course is anticipated with a 
cool calmness:  
“Tell me about Node,” she suggested, “It doesn’t seem to be generating much in the 
way of industry gossip.” 
“No?” 
“No.” 
He lowered his finger-steeple. “Anti-buzz,” he said. “Definition by absence.” (111) 
 
Bigend’s fascination for absence is curious. Pamela Mainwaring, English, who 
previously worked for Blue Ant in London describes the extremity of his enigma: 
“He doesn’t want you to have heard of him. He doesn’t want people to have heard of 
Blue Ant, either. We’re often described as the first viral agency. Hubertus doesn’t 
like the term, and for good reason. Foregrounding the agency, or its founder, is 
counterproductive. He says he wishes we could operate as a black hole, an absence” 
(Gibson 146). 
 
It is evident that Bigend has a desire to be absent, but also a desire to be an all-
encompassing presence at the same time, as if his presence paradoxically becomes 
more powerful through an absent-presence. Pamela’s metaphor of operating as a 
black hole emphasizes Bigend’s stringent desire to have a vacuum effect on society 
and redirect attention and interest into matters he wants to define as concerning that as 
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yet have no market, which undoubtedly is a question of power. This discursive 
practice of wielding power and control through branding information knowledge is 
similar to the cool hunting work he has Cayce Pollard do in Pattern Recognition and 
the branding concepts of Transmission’s Guy Swift, which are largely about 
accessibility and avant-gardism. There is a crucial difference, however; in Spook 
Country and Transmission respectively, Bigend seeks to brand information and 
knowledge not yet discovered by others, and Guy attempts to brand a fabricated 
notion of a coherent and elite European Union – in which both situations are branding 
abstractions – but in Pattern Recognition, branding concepts are applied to material 
goods. Thus, in Spook Country, Bigend seeks to reshape access to and flows of 
information to his own pecuniary advantage through exclusive accessibility to raw 
information and knowledge, which explains his stringent desire for privacy and 
inscrutability, for a lack of either may foil his ability to privatize the information and 
knowledge he gathers. 
 Bigend’s concern over issues of privacy, thus, derives from the necessity of 
masking his power to perpetuate it. David Harvey explains that in neoliberalism,  
There are presumed to be no asymmetries of power or information that interfere with 
the capacity of individuals to make rational economic decisions in their own interests. 
This condition is rarely, if ever, approximated in practice…Better informed and more 
powerful players have an advantage that can all too easily be parlayed into procuring 
even better information and greater relative power. (BHN 68) 
 
By masking the power he wields behind the scenes, Bigend is able to simulate the 
notion that power is not asymmetric, and that everyone has equal access and 
opportunities. What results is what Rothkopf defines as an illiberal democracy, in 
which the market becomes “illiberal if [it] offer[s] the appearance of free competition 
without a level playing field, without truly having equal opportunity for all” (S 322). 
Thus, the fact that Bigend’s mother has a background highly involved with the 
Situationist International is highly ironic because the Situationist International stresses 
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the construction of situations, the use of technology, media of communication, and 
cultural forms to promote a revolution of everyday life, and to increase the realm of 
freedom, community, and empowerment; Bigend, however, only cares about 
empowering himself, and maintaining and increasing money and power, which in the 
21st century, means exclusive information about and access to the latest technological 
innovations and the military-industrial complex, which I will elaborate on in the next 
section. Bigend is, thus, Gibson's image of hyper-capitalist consciousness evolved to 
such sophistication that it becomes indistinguishable from art and philosophy. 
Advertising for Bigend is not a means to make money, but a method for manipulating 
individuals at the base of consciousness and culture. Although Bigend benefits from 
accessibility and exclusivity to information knowledge and innovative technology, it 
is important to bear in mind that Bigend is merely capitalizing on a larger scheme that 
already exists beyond his individual capacity.  
Ghostly Matters: Public Concerns, Private Solutions 
 
 The narratives all converge on a shipping container of unspecified cargo that 
is transported to – which we discover at the very end of the novel – Vancouver. In 
Vancouver, an old man – who still has connections to American intelligence circles, 
and whom Tito passes iPods with encrypted data to in department stores – and his 
team irradiate the shipping container and uncover millions of U.S. dollars diverted 
from Iraq reconstruction funds. This might sound too incredulous of an overarching 
espionage plot that only reiterates the question of whether the novel has any cultural, 
political, and/or social value whatsoever, but what if a similar situation has indeed 
occurred in our reality? In 2007, just as Gibson was preparing Spook Country for 
publication, The Guardian journalist David Pallister reported, “[i]n the year after the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 nearly 281 million notes, weighing 363 tonnes, were sent 
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from New York to Baghdad for disbursement to Iraqi ministries and US contractors” 
for reconstruction, but billions were lost without a trace to corruption and waste. Then 
Chairman of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, Henry 
Waxman, said the way the money had been handled was startling: “The numbers are 
so large that it doesn't seem possible that they're true. Who in their right mind would 
send 363 tonnes of cash into a war zone?”  
 Spook Country offers an explanation to Waxman’s question. The old man 
explains how the cargo came to his attention: “It was discovered in transit, by a team 
of American intelligence operators, assigned to look for a very different sort of cargo” 
(Gibson 465) that is, “weapons of mass destruction” (WMD). “They were ordered off 
the case immediately,” he continues, “but in a way that created a snag in the fabric of 
things, bureaucratically” (465), thus suggesting that high-ranking officials were 
involved. But why was America searching for WMD in Iraq in the first place? The 
war in Iraq definitely seems less based on substantial evidence of the Iraqi 
government’s involvement in terrorism and more on fallacious logic. On February 12, 
2002, then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, at a press briefing where he 
addressed the absence of evidence linking the Iraqi government with supplying WMD 
to terrorist groups, stated: “[T]here are known knowns; there are things we know we 
know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are 
some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns – there are things 
we do not know we don't know.” In The Reality of the Virtual, !i"ek explains that 
…if Rumsfeld thinks that the main dangers in the confrontation with Iraq were the 
‘unknown unknowns,” that is, the threats from Saddam whose nature we cannot even 
suspect, then the Abu Ghraib scandal27 shows that the main dangers lie in the 
"unknown knowns" – the disavowed beliefs, suppositions and obscene practices we 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 U.S. military personnel and other governmental agencies committed human rights violations in the 
form of physical, psychological, and sexual abuse including torture, sodomy, rape, and homicide of Al-
Qaeda detainees held in Abu Ghraib. 
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pretend not to know about, even though they form the background of our public 
values. (2004) 
 
In aftermath of 9/11, the American public had a heightened sense of anxiety and 
desire for homeland security regardless of how inhumane and blatantly racist some of 
the implemented security measures were. The shared feelings of deep vulnerability, 
rage, and grief which 9/11 aroused could not help but unite the people affected by this 
monumental act of violence. There was a general sense of unity across all political 
and social divides in the American public with the burgeoning of patriotism – 
Americans united as victims of an “unwarranted” attack, and united against a 
common enemy. In short, Americans acquiesced to anything the government 
conducted and imposed in the name of homeland security. 
According to Stephan Salisbury, “[t]he ubiquitous fantasy of ‘homeland 
security,’ pushed hard by the federal government in the wake of 9/11, has been widely 
embraced by the public” (2012). Those in high-ranking official positions have 
capitalized on the ambient sense of invasiveness in all aspects of American life after 
the collapse of the twin towers to build patriotism amongst the public and justify a 
war for profit. According to the old man, the hundred million was never intended to 
return to “any part of the First World” because the amount was too “unwieldy” and 
there “are [Third World] economies, however, in which that sort of money can be 
traded for one thing or another, without too punishing a discount” (Gibson 465). He 
tells Hollis, “[i]n terms of profiteering from the war, Miss Henry, this is a piddling 
amount” but he finds “the sheer gall of it fascinating” because it was simply and 
unimaginatively put “[o]ut the door of the New York Fed, onto the back of a truck in 
Baghdad, one thing and another, then sail[ed] it away” (466). Yes, the entire scheme 
was just that easy, which illustrates that money laundering and its derivatives have 
become significant and a troubling component of global financial flows, but more 
 95 
importantly, that the political class is heavily implicated and has manipulated and 
mobilized nationalism for their private interests in reaping the benefits of informal 
global financial flows while disregarding public needs of their citizens. Salibury 
criticizes that “[s]o much money has gone into armoring and arming local law-
enforcement since 9/11 that the federal government could have rebuilt post-Katrina 
New Orleans five times over and had enough money left in the kitty to provide job 
training and housing for every one of the record 41,000-plus homeless people in New 
York City” (2012), many of whom – as aforementioned – were left out in the 
gentrification of the city in its pursuit to become world-class. 
Perhaps the political class’ implication in global financial flows is not entirely 
one out of self-interest, but a circumstance necessitated as a reflexive method of 
protecting national interests – at least insofar as keeping corporations within their 
country’s borders. Rothkopf states, “[c]orporations now enjoy transnational status 
which, while still subjecting them to national laws everywhere, often allows them to 
exert significant power on the governments whose laws define them” because 
“[w]hen one government won’t oblige, they move to another” (S 80). For instance, 
former U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney’s Halliburton derives a significant amount of 
its revenue from the U.S. government and its U.S. operations, but when public 
opinion turned against the company, it moved its headquarters to the Persian Gulf. 
Rothkopf elaborates, 
In a global economy in which multinational corporations are no longer bound to any 
single country, they have gained a new kind of power over national governments, 
which by their nature are confined by borders. Companies have created a new kind of 
marketplace in which governments compete with one another for investment, 
essentially undercutting in a fundamental way some of the most familiar, potent, and 
until recently enduring foundations of sovereignty. (119) 
 
Rothkopf is, of course, suggesting that global economics has undermined the enduring 
foundations of democracy in exchange for a “free market” where nation-states take a 
 96 
backseat to governing and yield to TNCs with the ambition of attracting investment 
on their soil. David Harvey writes, 
Asymmetric power relations tend, therefore, to increase rather than diminish over 
time unless the state steps in to counteract them. The neoliberal presumption of 
perfect information and a level playing field for competition appears as either 
innocently utopian or a deliberate obfuscation of processes that will lead to the 
concentration of wealth and, therefore, the restoration of class power. (BHN 68) 
 
The state, I argue, is a failed one if it fails to protect and preserve its democratic 
foundations and/or values and does not take measures in providing a (relatively) level 
playing field, and instead contributes to the concentration of wealth and power within 
an increasingly small (and transnational) population, even if it is concomitant of a 
national interest to remain globally competitive. In Morozov’s words, “[t]he only 
thing worse than an authoritarian state is a failed one” (ND 264). What becomes 
evident is that the democratic form is fundamentally compromised and colonized by 
the interests of capital in the postmodern epoch. 
In the present stage of capitalism, Debord writes, “in which social life has 
become completely dominated by the accumulated productions of the economy,” 
there is a bringing about of “a general shift from having to appearing – all ‘having’ 
must now derive its immediate prestige and its ultimate purpose from appearances” 
(SS 11). States no longer need to have democracy; they merely need to appear as 
democratic – that is, as a liberal democracy that practices neoliberalism. With the 
proliferation of ICTs that ensure the smooth running of global capitalism and 
enhancement of global financial flows, technological innovations become a form of 
measurement for democracy, and of course, the advancement or world-class stature of 
any given country. At this point, it is necessary to address the conflation of the state 
and country, and its impacts and relevance to citizenship in global discourse. To be a 
citizen is to bear the rights and obligations attached to membership in a given political 
community; for example, as an American citizen, one is entitled to certain liberties by 
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statute, but also has the responsibility of protecting the democratic statutes of the 
United States of America. But the American government and many of its bureaucrats 
is leaning towards capitalism that has no sense of social and moral responsibility, 
which brings us to whether Americans ought to consider themselves as subjects of the 
American government, or American citizens. Ronald Beiner explains that “it is 
through rational dialogue, and especially through political dialogue, that we clarify, 
even to ourselves, who we are and what we want” (PJ 152). Further, “it is through 
speech and deliberation that man finds the location of his propert humanity, between 
beast and god, in the life of the citizen” (152). According to Beiner, civic participation 
is crucial to humanity and individual identity. But as I have been arguing throughout 
this chapter and the previous chapters, capitalism creates a state in which people 
become subjects – of a higher authority – who have an illusion of having free choice 
rather than citizens of a country whose government exists to ensure their rights and 
freedoms (which, incidentally, includes providing equal opportunity to its citizens), 
and particularly in light of 9/11, Americans have become even more “willing” to 
surrender basic rights and freedoms in exchange for an illusion of security. !
As one would expect, a world-class state must necessarily have world-class 
technology, especially when it comes to the question of security. The fantasy of 
homeland security “has also excited intense weapons- and techno-envy among police 
departments and municipalities vying for the latest in armor and spy equipment” and 
[t]he truth is that virtually the entire apparatus of government has been mobilized and 
militarized right down to the university campus” (Salisbury 2012). For instance, in the 
past year alone, we have seen many protests against tuition hikes across the 
University of California campuses – perhaps most notably, the ones taken place at the 
University of California, Davis (UC Davis) in which professors and students were 
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arrested. David Simpson describes Davis as a campus that “has long been popular 
with parents looking for a safe and sequestered life for their children, deterred by the 
history of student radicalism at Berkeley or Santa Cruz,” but when Davis students set 
about a peaceful occupation with night sticks, a UC Davis police officer “in full riot 
gear” doused students “at close range and in the face with military-grade pepper 
spray” (November 2011). While I agree with Simpson that compared with global 
violence, this incident is considerably a trifling matter, it nevertheless is evidence that 
even the university campus – a place of higher education and typically of free 
thinking – has militarized in the name of “homeland security.” Simpson further 
discloses that “[s]tudents of various non-majoritarian or dissenting groups have 
consistently complained about the campus police and have made claims of racial 
profiling and threatening behaviour” that’s gotten worse since 9/11 perhaps because 
“[p]eople who wear a uniform and body armour and carry a gun can all too readily 
imagine themselves as homeland heroes.” He ultimately explains that “[i]n a highly 
militarised culture obsessed with high-tech weapons and actively involved in using 
them all over the world, it is not surprising that an officer in an unthreatening 
situation should resort to some sort of violence” to suppress a form of mass 
communication to perform collective responsibility. 
In Spook Country, however, the prospect of civic participation having any 
impact, as Hollis’ mother suggests, is dismal when information is tightly controlled 
and power is concentrated amongst a very few, such that the old man decides to take 
matters into his own hands by organizing a team of spooks with specialized skill sets 
necessary to foil the WMD cargo conspiracy. Even in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, 
when there was a great surge of patriotism that led Americans to blindly accept 
infringements upon civil liberties, the old man who “was a counterintelligence 
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officer” who once kept secrets for the government is as “American” as one can get in 
putting his position as an American citizen before his subject position to the state; 
hence, he is now considered a “a renegade, a rogue player” (Gibson 191). Although 
he was a spook for the American government, he now spooks his former employer 
because he “detest[s] certain policies, certain figures in the government whom [he] 
believe[s] guilty of crimes” (Gibson 192) that divert the US from being a welfare state 
to a failed state that caters to private interests and disregards public interest. The 
present political environment is one in which the power of the state to intervene in 
markets is constrained by private global ICT networks endowed with a velocity of 
information flow, resulting in a decline of civic engagement in a liberal democracy; as 
such, the old man’s re-engagement with politics is dependent on the use of Internet 
and new and more interactive communication technologies as seen through the use of 
locative art. Thus, the old man utilizes the connections he built as a spook to access 
various technologies an average person would not be able to for “ethical” reasons. 
Near the end of his famous essay “The Question Concerning Technology”, 
Martin Heidegger concludes that the only way to recover agency with respect to the 
enframing essence of modern technology and its associated modes of being -  modes 
of being characterized by calculation, instrumental reason, rootlessness and the will to 
master human and non-human nature – is to manage somehow to “catch sight of what 
comes to presence in technology, instead of merely gaping at the technological” (32). 
Every technological instrument or system is evident of the very essence of technology 
itself and, if we catch sight of that, it becomes possible to establish a relationship with 
technology in which we do not cede to it the ground of independent moral and 
political judgment upon which stands human agency and citizenship. If, however, we 
approach discrete technologies simply as instruments, either to be used or even to be 
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mastered, we give ourselves over to the enframing essence of technology, to being 
enframed as technological beings, such as the militant police officers at Davis. It is 
therefore the responsibility of the active citizen to creatively engage these 
technologies, as well as to critically analyze the diverse developments of the 
cyberculture, especially when cyberculture is used against humanity. The old man 
indeed creatively engages with the technologies available in his society only to reveal 
his scheme as an expensive and criminal but arguably righteous(?) plot in preventing 
money laundering. In spite of the resources he has collected and exploited to correct a 
wrong, the moment and role he plays in history will remain a secret, and so too will 
the covert operation he seeks to obstruct. Moreover, the level of privacy his entire 
project requires is problematic in and of itself because everything is privatized and 
conducted covertly, the government notwithstanding, suggesting that the political 
class plays a significant role in technocapitalism, which is exactly why his 
interception must also be a covert operation. While the old man is promising a private 
solution to a serious social and political problem, we must be wary of the fact that he 
is ultimately relying on private dead-end measures to correct a wrong that he 
personally finds problematic, but this provides no real and viable solution for 
everyone else who is subjected and victimized by neoliberalism and militant 
governments of failed states. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The world in the 21st century, as Spook Country portrays, is undoubtedly very 
alarming in that individuals are constantly under surveillance and left only with the 
illusion of having free choice; but at the same time, it is phenomenal and audacious 
with the combination of technological innovations that increase efficiency in global 
financial and informational flows and challenge conventional perceptions of reality 
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and materiality, and the gentrification of previously run-down neighborhoods in 
global/informational cities as a movement towards world-class stature, which leads to 
the umbrella image of neoliberal globalization (re)shaping the world into a hi-tech 
one populated with savvy cosmopolitans. But as we know, the superclass have control 
– they control the economy and politics to safeguard their interests, and imperial 
corporate power even controls media so that people cannot see the human costs 
behind their greed. What is perturbing is that it is more than the United States, it is the 
people controlling the United States, Britain, and other countries that impose 
neoliberal economic policies both on their own soil and abroad. And beyond all of 
this, the university which was once thought of as the place of higher education, 
academic freedom, and intellectual curiosity – in short, the birthplace of ideas, 
innovations, and knowledge – has fallen under neoliberal surveillance28 and is no 
longer a steppingstone haven for political reform. Be that as it may, literature – as 
much as it has necessarily become a commodity in our postmodern epoch of increased 
privatization and commodification – in its postmodern form, remains pertinent to 
socio-cultural and –political discourse. By portraying the very real problems of our 
global 21st century in commodifying fiction, it becomes more widely accessible and 
understandable. In the case of Spook Country, William Gibson, through the eyes of 
Hollis Henry – who becomes a social detective for us – illustrates the underlying 
dynamics of the glamor of globalization, which is deeply problematic, and needless to 
say, uneven. Nevertheless, understanding that neoliberal globalization and/or liberal 
democracy is profoundly uneven and undemocratic, and some of the basic dynamics 
that lead to these quandaries is already a good start towards social and political reform, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 See Chris Lorenz’ “If You’re So Smart, Why Are You under Surveillance? Universities, 
Neoliberalism, and New Public Management.” 
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and literary fiction is a tool that can instigate the understanding and critical 
examination of global processes. 
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Conclusion 
 
Francis Fukuyama has declared the post-1989 global movement of nation-
states towards liberal democratic governance as a Hegelian universal End of History; 
with the Fall of Communism/Autumn of Nations, humanity has finally reached the 
teleological endpoint of 'Enlightenment', such that there is a decentering of 
geopolitical power relations - in other words, who you are and where you come from 
no longer matters because domestic/international and political/economic goals have 
conflated for the advancement of civilization. However, I believe that at some point in 
the 1980s, with Reaganomics, Thatcherism, and the general onrush of neoliberalism 
or global capitalism, history took a turn in the opposite direction. Thus, this thesis 
considered three works of fiction published in the 1980s and onwards to examine the 
transition of contemporary literary fiction in juxtaposition with changing economic 
and social conditions. In chapter one, I examined the myth of the nation and the 
enduring quality (and necessity) of nationalism in spite of shifting power dynamics 
and a concomitant reconfiguration of social hierarchy in accordance with the 
economic and political changes as the British empire waned. In chapter two, I 
discussed modernity as a game of catch-up dependent on a nation’s ability to develop 
technological innovations and infrastructure to compete in the global economy. And 
finally, in the third chapter, I argued that the unrelenting expansion of ICTs is 
relentlessly continuing to transform the production of an emergent postmodern 
economy, in which democracy is declared when the chasm between the rich and poor 
has only widened.  
Far from the end of history, I therefore argue that we are experiencing a 
reversal in history. Baudrillard writes, “[o]nce the apogee of time, the summit of the 
curve of evolution, the solstice of history had been passed, the downward slope of 
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events began and things began to run in reverse” (IE 10). This cultural logic of late 
capitalism emphatically marks “the end of linearity, and in this perspective, the future 
no longer exists” (10-1). “But,” Baudrillard continues, “if there is no longer a future, 
there is no longer an end either. So this is not even the end of history” (10-1). If we 
take the a priori assumption that English departments contribute to cultural production, 
or at least the reproduction of it vis-a-vis what I consider to be the antediluvian claim 
that they seek to "enlighten" and move civilization towards advancement and progress 
by raising cultural awareness, why, then, are English departments nevertheless 
pedagogically privileging and reproducing the cultural norms and practices of what 
was known as the "center"? The bifurcation of English literary studies into 
"American" and "English" literature seems, to me, to reinforce the idea that the West 
remains at the center of civilization, and by extension, Enlightenment vis-a-vis 
modernity, which in this perspective, is to say that there is a great deal to learn from 
Western cultures. In other words, English departments are still producing national 
one-sidedness curricula, thus contributing to the (re)production of cultural hegemony 
and imperialism in an epoch when globalization (which implies postnationalism and 
decolonization) is at the forefront. In short, the English department is too far removed 
from current economic, social, and political realities, which renders it dysfunctional 
for its purported objectives and functions in the advent of the liberal arts and/or 
interdisciplinary studies. If the English department is to remain relevant and viable - 
and we've all certainly heard of the quagmires the humanities are facing - to culture 
and society, it necessarily needs reforms contingent to the cultural logic of our 
postmodern global 21st century. 
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